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CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT AGREEMENTS

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MARKUP

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

ON

H. Con. Res. 350

JUNE 12, 1986

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CONTINUED COMPLIANCE WITH THE SALT AGREEMENTS

THURSDAY, JUNE 12, 1986

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The committee met in open markup session at 10 a.m., in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Dante B. Fascell (chairman) presiding.

Chairman FASCELL. The committee will come to order. The chief of staff will report the pending resolution.

READING OF THE RESOLUTION

Mr. BRADY [reading]:

H. Con. Res. 350, concurrent resolution providing that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection, further reading of the resolution will be dispensed with and open for amendment. The Chair will recognize the gentleman from Michigan.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I wonder, though, if the entire text of the resolution could be read. It is a brief resolution.

Chairman FASCELL. The chief of staff will read the resolution.

Mr. BRADY [reading]:

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), Section 1: Findings:

The Congress finds that:

One, vital United States national security interests are served, especially in this time of fiscal austerity, by the SALT arms control agreements which impose important constraints on the growth of Soviet nuclear forces.

Two, a breakout from the SALT agreements would result in a significantly increased threat to the United States by allowing the Soviet Union to more than double the number of warheads it could have under the SALT agreements and to replace all of its single warhead ICBM's and SLBM's with multiple-warhead missiles.

Three, the SALT agreements provide important measures for monitoring Soviet nuclear force developments and verification of existing and future agreements.

Four, the United States and the Soviet Union have not undercut the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements.

Five, the SALT agreements have required the Soviet Union to remove over 1,000 ICBM's, over 240 SLBM's, and 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines.

Six, disputes over Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements can be resolved within the Standing Consultative Commission, as part of the ongoing negotiations at Geneva, or by any other means; and,

Seven, our European allies regard the President's willingness to exceed the SALT numerical sublimits later this year as highly detrimental to their security and have expressed their concern and sharp criticism over such a prospect.

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Section 2: Continued Adherence to SALT Numerical Sublimits:
The President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

Chairman FASCELL. Each member has before him the April hearings of the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science dealing with the implications of abandoning SALT. Since that time, the President has made two statements, one on May 27[1] and the other last night. We will have to take both of those statements into consideration. We have two representatives from the administration here to aid us in our discussion.

First, Mr. Broomfield wants to make a statement.

CONCERN OVER SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I believe that the strategic arms control, if done properly, can provide the United States and the American people with a sense of security. I want to emphasize, though, that arms control, however, must be a two-way street.

In this regard, I believe that President Reagan, despite numerous efforts on his part to try to reverse the Soviet activities through diplomatic channels and Standing Consultative Commission, made clear in arms compliance report to the Congress, that the Soviets have not kept their word to us.

Apart from the numerical limitation problems which the resolution before us attempts to address, the Soviets have violated their commitment to SALT II in several important areas.

They have deployed a second new ICBM, and are preventing verification through encryption of missile testing information.

The Soviet Union continues to build a major new ABM radar in violation of the ABM Treaty, and the Chernobyl disaster serves as an unnerving reminder of another attempt by the Soviet leaders to cover up.

I had hoped, when Gorbachev was selected as Soviet leader, that we could make progress in nuclear arms control, but Chernobyl is the latest example of how difficult it is to deal with the Soviet leadership.

I have to say, Mr. Chairman, you and I were just over there fortunately a few weeks before the Chernobyl incident, and my impression with Mr. Gorbachev was one, I thought he was sincere, but the more you read about him, he is more interested in publicity rather than getting down to serious facts, particularly in the arms control area.

I believe the United States has gone the extra mile, and we continue to abide by the SALT agreement at this very time. With the President's proposed dismantlement of the *Poseidon* submarines, our Nation remains in compliance with SALT II and its sublimits.

If the Soviets show willingness for progress in Geneva and cease existing violations, it would be my hope that we would remain in compliance of the SALT agreements.

Most importantly, the United States is not abandoning arms control compliance. There is no obituary for arms reduction. The Soviets

[1] The President's statement of May 27, 1986 on interim restraint appears in app. 1.

just tabled a new START proposal in Geneva yesterday. There is still hope for progress in the INF area.

However, no policy of interim restraint with higher numbers of nuclear weapons systems is a substitute for an agreement on deep mutual and verifiable reduction in offensive nuclear arms, which the United States is pursuing with the Soviet Union in Geneva.

Achieving such reduction has been, and continues to be, the President's highest priority. What concerns me most is that the Congress is rapidly considering legislation which has not taken into account the seriousness of Soviet violations while preventing hope for substantive arms reduction.

Mr. Chairman, I reserve the right to offer an amendment on the bill that is before us at a later time, during this debate.

CONSEQUENCES OF UNITED STATES INTENT TO ABANDON SALT

Chairman FASCELL. Well, the implications of the President's statement on May 27 certainly warrant our attention. He announced on that date that the United States would no longer remain in compliance with SALT when, later this year, the United States deployed the 131st B-52 equipped with air-launched cruise missiles.

Now, last night, the President's statement at his press conference seemed to bring us back to where we were before May 27, which is obviously an effort to preserve our options. That certainly seems to be a more sensible position, but if we are about to embark on a major policy change, then this resolution is indeed an appropriate response.

The Congress has gone on record many times before on this issue. There is no question that the Soviet Union has violated, the terms of SALT II with respect to the SS-25 telemetry encryption, and the Krasnoyarsk radar. Those are serious, and they need to be resolved. But the terms of SALT have placed real limitations on the level of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. If we announce in advance that we are not going to be bound by those limits anymore, then we give the Soviets an opportunity to say that they are not bound, either. They have already responded in this fashion to the President's pronouncement.

It seems to me a more sensible approach would be to say that we are going to stay with the SALT limits and drive for a new agreement which would take into consideration [illegible] violations that we are concerned about.

SOVIET BEHAVIOR DEMONSTRATES LACK OF GOOD FAITH

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to comment about that.

I think the whole question will be determined by Soviet behavior. I don't know why we should not keep the pressure on the Soviet Union to negotiate in good faith in Geneva. I think the President made it very clear that if the Soviet behavior changes and they show good faith toward negotiations, that obviously we are going to stay in compliance, and that is the key to it.

I think when you have a man like Gorbachev who is willing to lie to the entire world about what happened at Chernobyl, if it hadn't been for the Swedes noticing the high radiation, one only knows how long they would try to stonewall that situation over there.

It is about time we have some good-faith effort other merely filing proposals in Geneva. The Soviet Union should get down to serious bargaining in order that we can achieve a meaningful agreement.

SALT AGREEMENT PROTECTS U.S. INTERESTS

Chairman FASCELL. We have proposals pending in Geneva, and it would be nice if both leaders would issue instructions to their negotiators to get some movement. But in the meantime, our frustration with Soviet behavior should not be the motivating force with regard to our own security.

It does not make sense to walk away from an arrangement we have, imperfect though it is, when our own security would be adversely affected by allowing the Soviets to more than double their warheads, MIRV their single warhead missiles, convert their SS-18's with 10 warheads to 14, et cetera, and so on.

We open the door unnecessarily. We still have to try to resolve our disputes with them, but those problems should be worked out at the Standing Consultative Commission. Let's not give them an excuse to go out and enlarge their capability regardless of what is in our own best interests.

IMPLICATIONS OF STATED INTENT TO ABANDON SALT

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, one further question?

Chairman FASCELL. Yes.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Assume that we have further violations by the Soviet Union, and everybody recognizes them in the next few months and they get to a point where there is serious question as it affects the United States national security.

Then where would you stand as far as the President of the United States is concerned?

Chairman FASCELL. I would have to make a judgment at that time.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. That is what the President wants.

Chairman FASCELL. I am concerned about the decision the President appears to be making right now. It simply endangers our security and gives the Soviets an opening unnecessarily.

We don't need to make that judgment today. That is what the President did on May 27. He made a preemptive judgment with respect to continuing an arrangement which is in our best interests at the moment. It may be later on it would no longer be in our interests. The President always has that option.

Why jump out ahead of time to make a decision which does not have to be made for some time yet, when abiding by the arrangements we now have keeps the size of the Soviet nuclear forces in check.

My colleagues have some questions they would like to ask our administration representatives. Could we have Mr. John Hawes, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, and Mr. Mike Mobbs, Assistant Director of the Strategic Programs

Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, come to the witness table.

QUESTION OF ADMINISTRATION REPRESENTATION

Mr. HYDE. I would like to make a statement. Well, Mr. Chairman, I feel strongly that this is not a responsible resolution. It is not an accurate resolution. It is not a constructive resolution, and this procedure is bizarre, if not obnoxious.

I am told that Mr. Adelman, who was scheduled to testify this morning, was notified last evening at 6 not to bother to come in, so we are going ahead—now we have two other people here.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hyde, can I interrupt you there?

Mr. HYDE. Sure.

Chairman FASCELL. We wanted to have an administration witness in the sense that you are talking about. We never could get confirmation in time for the meeting notice as to who that witness was going to be. It was not until 4:30 last evening, when I talked to Mr. Broomfield, that I found out Mr. Adelman was prepared to testify. In the meantime, we told the other witnesses not to come because we couldn't get an administration representative.

As far as the testimony is concerned, however, the subcommittee had ample hearings.

Mr. HYDE. You mean we markup and then we will hear Mr. Adelman.

Chairman FASCELL. No, we have heard Mr. Adelman many times on this issue.

Mr. HYDE. Implications of abandoning SALT, the hearings I have are dated April 15, 1986, and we have two witnesses, Harold Brown and the Honorable Ralph Earle, partner of the law firm of Baker & Daniels.

Now, on this resolution, the last version, I understand was prepared last evening, we have not heard Mr. Adelman.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hyde, I'll emphasize again that I talked to Mr. Adelman about coming to today's hearings. Up until 4:30, we couldn't get anybody in the administration to tell us who they were going to send to testify.

Mr. HYDE. And was Mr. Adelman notified not to come at 6 last night?

Chairman FASCELL. Yes, and I am the one who notified him. Sooner or later, I had to make a decision with Mr. Broomfield what we were going to do today.

Mr. HYDE. We are going to markup a very important bill, and we have not heard from any administration witnesses except these two gentlemen. Did you know you were going to testify this morning, either of you?

Have you prepared testimony?

STATEMENT OF MIKE MOBBS, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC PROGRAMS BUREAU, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. MOBBS. We are prepared.

Mr. HYDE. You are prepared, but you didn't know you were going to testify?

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Mr. MOBBS. We are prepared to answer questions.

Mr. HYDE. Do you have a prepared statement?

Mr. MOBBS. No, sir.

Mr. HYDE. But you are prepared to answer questions, because that is your job to know the subject.

Mr. MOBBS. Yes, sir.

RESOLUTION IGNORES SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Mr. HYDE. All right, fine. There are errors in every paragraph of this resolution. An egregious example is paragraph 5. Paragraph 5 of the last version. And the ink is still blurry on my copy.

It says, the SALT agreements have required the Soviet Union to remove over 1,000 ICBM's, over 240 SLBM's, and 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines. That is twice what the Soviets admit they have removed, so this is to the left of Moscow.

It is highly inaccurate. It is unprofessional. It is uninformed, and this kind of factual error on an essential element of this resolution is, I am sorry to say, typical of the whole resolution, but we are going to mark it up today, onward and upward.

The haphazard way in which this resolution has been drafted, is indicated by the change that you made at the last moment from numerical limits from today's version, to numerical sublimits, and I suspect, someone found out that the Soviets have not been adhering to the numerical limits, and so you change it to sublimits.

There is some doubt that they are adhering to that. What do we say about the SS-25, Mr. Chairman? Do we avert our eyes as though it isn't there, like an elderly person crossing the street looking straight down and hoping cars won't hit her?

We have all seen that happen. What about encryption of telemetry? This comprehensive discussion of what our role should be in the SALT Treaty ignores totally Soviet violations.

What a friendly gesture to Mr. Gorbachev. If there were truth in labeling on resolutions, this would have every mention of SALT II followed by unratified, expired, violated nontreaty. It never mentions those facts.

Not one word about Soviet violations of the letter and the spirit of SALT II. Paragraph 6, however, a triumph of hope over reality, says disputes over Soviet compliance with the SALT agreement can be resolved within the Standing Consultative Commission.

Oh, that is a relief to me, Mr. Chairman. It has been working fine. They have dismantled the SS-25, they are no longer encrypting their telemetry, and I understand they may take down the phased radar at Krasnoyarsk, too.

I want to compliment the Standing Consultative Commission. Even the most fervent worshipper of SALT admits there are Soviet violations, Paul Warnke, a strong advocate of SALT, says so, but this committee can't bring itself to say there have been SALT violations.

The timing and the substance of this, the procedure of the committee barging around in the china shop of arms control in Geneva like a rogue donkey, this is politics at its most obvious in substance, and in the rush to judgment, we should be moving forward to deep reductions, not enshrining a massively violated nontreaty

whose only function in history was to legitimate an arms buildup by the Soviet Union.

I yield to my friend from California.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. The gentleman said many of the same things I was going to say, although much more eloquently. The only thing you left out was the fact that the reason that was given by President Carter for withdrawing the SALT II agreement from the Senate, when we did so, was because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

There is no mention in this resolution Afghanistan.

Mr. HYDE. Well, is the gentleman telling me that the Soviets are still shooting up people in Afghanistan? Of course they are.

Mr. LAGOMARSINO. They would not do that, but it is alleged they are doing that.

Mr. HYDE. I yield to Mr. Gejdenson.

OVERRIDING IMPORTANCE OF NUCLEAR ARMS CONTROL

Mr. GEJDENSON. President Reagan took certain similar actions as well, because of the situation in Poland. Afghanistan has also changed his policies in that area and recognizing that while we have significant differences with the Soviets in many regions of the world, the issue of nuclear weapons is one that neither nation can afford to ignore, and you would agree with that. While many of us here are concerned about the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and in other places around the globe, the nuclear question is so important everywhere around the world.

Mr. HYDE. This hearing is already a plus.

Mr. GEJDENSON. What we all understand, however, is that the nuclear question is such a dominant one and has such a potential for obscuring all others, that we need to focus on it.

Mr. HYDE. In a candid and honest way rather than in an unprofessional and inaccurate political way, which is what this resolution is.

I yield back my time.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE IS SOURCE FOR SOVIET DISMANTLEMENT FIGURES

Chairman FASCELL. Let me take the balance of your time to respond to the question of the numbers. We are using DOD and JCS figures. If the gentleman wants to dispute them, he is at liberty to do so.

Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I had a few questions which I would like to ask the administration witnesses. First of all, a question was raised by Mr. Hyde as to the accuracy of paragraph 5. I was under the impression that it was fairly clear that the Soviet Union has removed over 1,000 ICBM's, over 240 SLBM's and 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines, pursuant to the SALT agreement.

Is that statement correct?

Mr. MORRS. That is not consistent with our best estimates, nor is it consistent with what the Soviets themselves claim. The Soviets

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claim to have dismantled under the SALT I and the SALT II Treaties a total of 540 launchers.

Our best estimates are only about less than 5 percent higher than that.

Mr. SOLARZ. Let's take it category by category. What is our estimate as to the number of ICBM warheads they have removed cr dismantled, pursuant to the SALT agreements?

Mr. MOBBS. Are we talking of ICBM missiles or warheads? The resolution speaks to missiles.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, OK, how many missiles?

Mr. MOBBS. ICBM launchers, the Soviets have dismantled about 192 under SALT I and about 72 under SALT II.

Mr. SOLARZ. That is launchers?

Mr. MOBBS. Yes, sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. 192 under SALT I, and how many under SALT II?

Mr. MOBBS. Approximately 72.

Mr. SOLARZ. How many ICBM warheads have they removed under these two agreements?

Mr. MOBBS. I don't have that figure with me this morning.

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you get that for us right away, send a message back to the shop?

Mr. MOBBS. We can get it.

Mr. SOLARZ. If you can try to get it. How many SLBM's have been dismantled?

Mr. MOBBS. Approximately 255 under SALT I, and so far none under SALT II.

Mr SOLARZ. OK, Is it true that 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines have been dismantled?

Mr. MOBBS. Yes, sir, that sounds like the right number, yes, sir.

USE OF STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Mr SOLARZ. OK, Could you tell us what violations that we believe the Soviets committed of SALT I or SALT II, if any, have been resolved to our satisfaction through the Standing Consultative Commission?

Mr. MOBBS. None.

Mr. SOLARZ. With respect to either SALT I or SALT II?

Mr. MOBBS. That is correct.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you tell us how many complaints of alleged Soviet violations we have presented to the SCC in SALT I and II?

Mr. MOBBS. We began to raise the compliance concerns that the administration had as early as 1981. Of course, at that time, we did not know about certain subsequent concerns that later came to light.

Mr. SOLARZ. You are saying before 1981, there was never any complaint put by us before the SCC?

Mr. MOBBS. I am just speaking of the current administration.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am talking about history.

Mr. MOBBS. There have been a series of discussions concerning questions of compliance in the SCC before 1981.

Mr. SOLARZ. Before 1981, were previous administrations capable of resolving to American satisfaction alleged Soviet violations within the framework of the SCC?

Mr. MOBBS. So far as I am aware, there were never any allegations of clear-cut Soviet violations prior to 1981. Therefore, there is no history in the SCC of which I am aware in which the two countries differed fundamentally on the underlying facts, on the underlying obligations of the treaty and on the underlying conclusions that they were reaching.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, was the SCC used before 1981?

Mr. MOBBS. Yes; it was.

Mr. SOLARZ. We presented concerns to the Soviet Union about their behavior prior to 1981?

Mr. MOBBS. Questions were raised. There were not allegations of noncompliance or conclusions by the United States that the Soviets had violated the Treaty, where we sought to have that situation redressed in the SCC.

To my knowledge, that was not the case prior to 1981.

Mr. SOLARZ. Well, how many questions did we raise?

Mr. MOBBS. I don't know how many.

Mr. SOLARZ. Can you find out for us.

Mr. MOBBS. Yes.

Mr. SOLARZ. Were all of those questions satisfactory answered?

Mr. MOBBS. The important thing to stress here is that the SCC institutionally is incapable of resolving disputes of fact or disputes of law, or disputes of policy, where the fundamental positions of the two countries involved are at odds, because the representatives of each country at the SCC simply represent the position of their country.

It is not a court of law. It cannot make resolutions or determinations or issue judgments or enforce its conclusions.

Mr. SOLARZ. We have raised presumably in the SCC our concerns over what we believe are Soviet violations of SALT II?

Mr. MOBBS. We have indeed for over 3 years.

Mr. SOLARZ. And we have raised our concerns with respect to what particular issues—the SS–25 as a violation of the prohibition on two new missiles?

LEVEL OF SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES CONTESTED

Mr. MOBBS. We have raised our concerns with respect to the SS–25 and Soviet telemetry encryption and Soviet noncompliance with the numerical limit of 2504 Strategic Nuclear Delivery Vehicles.

Mr. SOLARZ. What violation do we believe exists there?

Mr. MOBBS. The Soviets have exceeded that limit by about 25 or 30 launchers.

Mr. SOLARZ. What categories are included in that 2504 limit?

Mr. MOBBS. Primarily heavy bombers.

Mr. SOLARZ. Anything else besides that?

Mr. MOBBS. Included in the categories of 2504 SNDV's, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers.

Mr. SOLARZ. We believe they have exceeded that by 25?

Mr. MOBBS. 25 to 30.

Mr. SOLARZ. The excess is in which of those categories?

Mr. MOBBS. Heavy bombers principally.

Mr. SOLARZ. What is their response?

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Mr. MOBBS. That there is no violation, that they have simply converted some heavy bombers to tankers, but if that were true, the Treaty would have required them to equip those tankers with functionally related observable differences—

Chairman FASCELL. The committee will take a brief recess. We have to go vote.

[Recess.]

NO EVIDENCE OF SOVIET VIOLATION OF MIRV SUBCEILINGS

Chairman FASCELL. The committee will reconvene.

Mr. Solarz, you have one more question?

Mr. SOLARZ. One or two, Mr. Chairman. I want to make one thing clear for the record. The administration witnesses have said that the Soviets appear to be in excess of the overall limits in the SALT II agreement because of 25 heavy bombers that they say they have converted into tankers, but which we say they have not demonstrated they have converted into tankers.

Are you saying that the Soviets have violated many of the sublimits in SALT or complying?

Mr. MOBBS. So far, we have no evidence that they violated the MIRVed subceilings.

FUTURE FORCE LEVELS ABSENT SALT CONSTRAINTS

Mr. SOLARZ. Could you let us know what we are to expect if both sides were to abrogate their commitment to stay within the limits set within SALT II, given current rates of production in both countries, at the end of 5 and 10 years? If you have the information, how many additional launchers in each category for which sublimits were established, the Soviets would have produced and deployed, and how many we would, given current rates of production?

I am not talking now about breakout potentials, but based on current rates of production?

Mr. MOBBS. Let me answer that the best way I can, given the nature of the hearing. Our best estimate is that if the Soviets were to continue to comply with the limits of SALT II they would have, by 1990, approximately 13,000 weapons on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, which compares to about 10,000 that they have today.

We estimate that if they elected not to comply with the SALT II Treaty limits, that by 1990, their level of total strategic weapons would be somewhere around 14,000 or 15,000.

We estimate by 1994, if the Soviets continued to comply with SALT II, that their total strategic nuclear weapons would be around 16,000, under SALT II. If they elected not to observe the limits of SALT II by 1994, the uncertainty range is a little bit bigger, but we estimate it would be roughly 17,000 on the low end, up to perhaps 21,000 on the high end.

Mr. SOLARZ. And for the United States?

Mr. MOBBS. I don't have the figures for the United States that would compare to that, but the President has stated that he does not anticipate any appreciable increase in the levels of our strategic forces, and I would say that it is a reasonable expectation that even though we will continue to modernize, we will also continue to retire older systems as military and economic reasons so dictate.

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PROPORTIONATE RESPONSE TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Mr. SOLARZ. Let me ask you one final question, then, with respect to the Soviet violations that have been cited by the administration: the fact that they built two new missiles rather than the one permitted by SALT, and the fact that they are encrypting their telemetry beyond the point that we believe is permitted by the agreement. Why has the administration, given its inability so far to resolve those issues through the SCC, not chosen to respond in a proportionate way to those specific violations as distinguished from indicating that it plans to disregard, as a matter of policy, the numerical subceilings within the agreement?

For example, with respect to the SS-25, why couldn't we have said, if this is not resolved, we will deploy a second new missile, the Midgetman, in the same way you have deployed a second new missile with the SS-25.

With respect to telemetry, why couldn't we say, if this is not satisfactorily resolved, we will begin to encrypt our telemetry beyond where we encrypt it now, unless you are willing to reach an agreement with us on the SCC. This would indicate we are not going to stand by idly and do nothing while these Soviet violations take place, but would still preserving the numerical subceilings, the abrogation of which would appear to confer greater prospects for expansion of existing weapons on the Soviets than upon us.

Mr. MOBBS. With respect to the SS-25 and your proposed response to that, of course, the fact is that the United States for some years now has already had a small ICBM program in the research phase.

For us to try to characterize that as a response to a Soviet violation would be a little bit disingenuous, never mind the fact that our program is still strictly on paper, whereas their program is being deployed today, and our program still has many unanswered questions which have to be resolved, including questions regarding cost and basing, and so forth.

Mr. SOLARZ. My point was not that what we are doing is a violation of SALT II: it is not. My proposal was to announce, if we can't resolve the Soviet violation resulting from the fact that they have built two new missiles, that we will feel free to build a second missile ourselves?

Mr. MOBBS. I understood that to be the thrust of your question, but we already had our program in place for a second ICBM before we concluded the Soviets to be in violation.

With respect to telemetry encryption, obviously the Soviets have the benefit of dealing with the United States, which is a very open society, and it is open to reasonable doubt as to whether they have anywhere near the reliance on telemetry information for purposes of verifying the treaties that the United States must have on telemetry.

Let me just make a more general point, and that is that you have to——

Mr. HAMILTON. Will the gentleman yield?

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RATIONALE BEHIND PRESIDENT'S SALT POLICY

Mr. MOBBS. If I can finish my answer, please? You have to put into perspective the reason for the President's policy on SALT II in the first place. It was strictly a good-faith effort to set a constructive atmosphere for negotiations on the reduction of strategic arms.

It was never conceived as a policy whereby we thought we would be able to constrain the Soviets. We do not regard that as being the case now, and we did not regard that as being the case in 1982, because we don't think the SALT II Treaty imposes any meaningful constraints, fundamentally.

As the years went by from 1981, and then into 1982, 1983, 1984, and 1985, we began to find that the Soviets were in fact not honoring the commitment that they had made not to undercut SALT II, and the President had made it clear as part of his policy that our adherence to SALT II must be based on Soviet reciprocity, but Soviet reciprocity was absent.

Not only that, the original purpose for the policy which was to induce constructive movement in Geneva, did not appear to be working. The Soviets got up and walked away from the table in 1983, and stayed away for over a year, despite the fact that the United States was continuing to adhere to the treaty.

So, finally, the President was forced to address the question of whether or not his policy was working, and I think his answer was, it had not worked, and it was time to shift.

That is fundamentally the reason why we have elected, why the President has elected the decision that he has recently announced.

Mr. SOLARZ. I yield to the gentleman from Indiana.

SOVIET TELEMETRIC ENCRYPTION

Mr. HAMILTON. I want to go back to this question of encryption. It is my understanding that the Soviets have offered to discuss encryption provided that we would identify the signals which we want to read electronically, but we have refused to provide that information to the Soviets, because to do so would compromise some of our intelligence capabilities. Is that not correct?

Mr. MOBBS. A fundamental point to make——

Mr. HAMILTON. Is that not correct?

Mr. MOBBS. That is partially correct.

Mr. HAMILTON. What is incorrect?

Mr. MOBBS. The whole function of telemetry from the point of view of the party sending the telemetry is so that his engineers on the ground can monitor the functioning of the missile during its flight test and gather information that they consider to be important to the evaluation of their test program.

It also happens that the same information is useful to the other party who is trying to verify whether or not the testing party is in compliance with the treaty.

Now, it follows from that that the Soviets know perfectly well what telemetric information is relevant to the various provisions of the treaty.

They don't need to ask us about that. They know what telemetry consists of, and how it is to be interpreted.

Mr. HAMILTON. You are making a very big assumption there about what the Soviets can and cannot do.

The fact of the matter is that the Soviets have asked us for information about encryption. They want to know specifically what signals we want to be able to read electronically. We have said we won't furnish it to them.

Mr. MOBBS. The reason is because——

Mr. HAMILTON. Please hold off for a minute and let me complete my statement.

The reason we have said we won't furnish it is a perfectly valid reason, in my judgment, and the reason is that we don't want to indicate to them what our capabilities are. That is a valid reason. But to charge the Soviets with a clear violation in that case goes beyond the mark.

What you have, it seems to me, is a situation where the treaty simply is not as clear as we would like it to be, and the evidence that you bring forward to charge that the Soviets have violated the SALT II by encrypting the missile data is, I think, at best ambiguous and is, by no means, a clear violation. It is ambiguous.

You are right when you say that the Soviets are encrypting a lot of information that we think impedes the verification of the treaty. I agree with that. They are doing that. But neither are we coming forward and telling them what electronic signals we want.

When you have that kind of a situation, the way to resolve it is not to charge that the Soviets are in clear violation. The way to resolve it is through the procedures set forth in the treaty, through the Standing Consultative Commission, or to correct the language of the treaty. And the language is ambiguous on the point.

CLASSIFICATION OF SS-25

The same thing can be said with regard to the SS-25, only in a little different way. With regard to the SS-25, the treaty just is not clear as to what constitutes a new missile.

We do, indeed, as you and the administration have suggested, have a lot of evidence that what they have may be a new missile. But it is by no means abundantly clear that it is a new missile under the terms of the treaty. And I can go into that in some detail, if you like.

AMBIGUOUS PROVISIONS CAN AFFECT TREATY INTERPRETATION

The point simply is that we have a number of statements of clear Soviet violations of the SALT II Treaty made by the administration, but I do not think the situation is that clear. I think they are ambiguous. I think the evidence is certainly not the evidence of a Soviet Union trying to break out of the treaty. The evidence is that they are going to push that treaty right to the maximum, and maybe a little beyond the maximum, of interpretation of the treaty.

And may I say the reverse is also true, and I will give you an example of it. But I can't do it publicly. The reverse is also true. We are doing precisely the same thing. We are pushing the treaty right to the limits, and maybe a little beyond the limits.

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The Soviets are charging us with violations, as well, so this whole question of compliance is a difficult area, a highly technical area, and I don't for a moment want to suggest that I think these charges of violations are not serious. As the chairman said in his opening statement, they are serious concerns and they certainly do, as our friends on the other side of the aisle suggest, raise the most serious kinds of questions about arms control agreements.

But I think we have to be exceedingly careful about saying whether they are clear violations or not.

SOVIET ENCRYPTION PRACTICES

Mr. MOBBS. If I may comment on the question of encryption and the SS-25.

In 1979, when the SALT II provision on encryption was being finalized, representatives of the Carter administration who were engaged in those negotiations explicitly told the Soviets that if in the future—if the Soviets materially departed from their then current encryption practices, that the United States would regard such an action as inconsistent with the Soviet obligations under the treaty.

Since 1979, however, the Soviets have very dramatically increased the level of their encryption to the point, in some instances today, of almost 100 percent. Now, it seems to me, in light of that, that we do have very serious reason for concern.

Mr. HAMILTON. We have got to call their bluff on it. I agree with you; they are encrypting too much information. There is no question about that. And we have to call their bluff on it.

Mr. MOBBS. But, as you yourself pointed out, their encryption does impede verification, and under the terms of the treaty impeding verification is not permitted.

Mr. HAMILTON. We are in a catch-22 position here. If we answer their questions, we reveal information we don't want them to have.

QUESTION ON THROW WEIGHT OF SS-25

Mr. MOBBS. Regarding the SS-25, one quick point, and that is that while it is a technical matter in terms of what is a new type and what is not a new type, in this instance our best information is the throw-weight of the SS-25 is roughly twice the throw-weight of the SS-13. Yet, the Soviets claim the SS-25 is just a modification of the SS-13. If that were true, the throw weight could not exceed the SS-13's throw-weight by more than 5 percent. So, the fact that it is twice the throw-weight of the SS-13 leaves no margin for reasonable doubt as to the fact it is a violation.

Mr. HAMILTON. The Soviets charge that the administration has intentionally overestimated the weight of the SS-25. We include the weight of the instrumentation package that measures a missile performance, and that would not be ordinarily in the missile if it was used for an operational purpose.

Mr. MOBBS. It would be there when the missile is being tested, and that is the time it has to be monitored.

Mr. HAMILTON. You have difficult judgments here as to what is a new missile and what is not. I am simply saying that I don't think the evidence is all that clear. I think it is ambiguous at best, even with regard to the SS-25, and at the very least, we ought to pursue

the discussion of this through the channels provided to us in the treaty rather than just charging publicly—which I must say is a departure from previous administrations—charging publicly there have been clear violations, and repeating it over and over again, and not discussing the factual information pertaining to it.

These are very tough questions.

UNITED STATES RELIANCE ON SCC QUESTIONED

Mr. MOBBS. We have discussed all of these issues in the privacy of the SCC before these matters ever became public.

Mr. HAMILTON. I have talked with General Ellis about that, and that is simply not the case. We have not discussed these things at great length with the Soviets in the SCC.

Mr. MOBBS. I beg to differ. The fact is, we have. We have spent 11 sessions spanning over 3 years, in which each and every one of these issues has been discussed at length in the SCC. There is no question about that. And if the committee would care to examine the classified record on that, there is already a letter in the file from Mr. Adelman of a classified nature.

Mr. HAMILTON. General Ellis has been quoted in the press as saying that he has been authorized to complain, but he is not authorized to resolve the issue. That is the heart of the matter.

Mr. MOBBS. My understanding of his instructions is quite different.

Mr. HAMILTON. He is the guy that is carrying them out.

Mr. MOBBS. I am the guy who helps to write them back here.

Mr. HAMILTON. He doesn't understand your instructions then, because that is his statement.

Mr. HYDE. Will the gentleman yield?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hyde.

CRITICISM OF SALT TREATY

Mr. HYDE. It is very clear, when the President said SALT II is a flawed treaty, if indeed a brand new missile of substantially more throw-weight than the SS-13—the SS-25—if that is ambiguous under the treaty, what good is the treaty? If encrypting telemetry, if it is ambiguous as to whether that is a violation, we sure do need a new treaty, and we ought not to enshrine this monument to ambiguity then, which only legitimates the production of new and heavier weapons and the concealment of our ability or the impeding of our ability to verify.

Let me just read from the SALT Treaty on encryption.

ARTICLE 15

One: For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this treaty, each party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognised principles of international law.

Two: Each party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other party operating in accordance with paragraph 1.

Three: Each party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this treaty.

I suppose that is ambiguous, but I don't see the ambiguity. And as to the SS–25, the treaty, the second understanding on SALT II, says—as used in the second agreed statement, et cetera, et cetera—the term "differing to the length, the diameter, launch-weight and the throw-weight of the missile" means a difference in excess of 5 percent from the value established for each of the above parameters.

Mr. Mobbs, you have said the throw-weight of the SS–25—what is our clear evidence of the throw-weight of the SS–25?

Mr. MOBBS. That it exceeds the throw-weight of the SS–13 by about twice.

Mr. HYDE. Is there any ambiguity there, as far as you are concerned?

Mr. MOBBS. Not as far as I am concerned.

NEED FOR CLEARER TREATY LANGUAGE

Mr. HAMILTON. Yes, there is ambiguity. The Soviet contention is that the SS–13 throw-weight includes guidance systems and penetration aids in its third stage, that we fail to include in our estimate of the throw-weight. So you got very tough differences with regard to the weight of the SS–13 and SS–25, and I know you have got an extremely difficult task.

The gentleman from Illinois makes a valid point. The real lesson of all of this is that the treaty's language is not as clearcut as we would like it to be. That is not the fault of these gentlemen here or maybe not even the fault of the negotiators. When you are negotiating, you have got tough problems on language, but it is not as clear and precise as it ought to be.

Mr. HYDE. We should move away from SALT toward a treaty that accomplishes something, rather than enshrine this tribute to ambiguity.

I am out of time, Sam. Sorry.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Zschau.

NECESSARY PRECONDITIONS FOR ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENT

Mr. ZSCHAU. Thank you.

I believe the issue we have to be addressing today is whether this resolution will be helpful or potentially harmful to the arms control process that is ongoing in Geneva. SALT I and SALT II are not the end, but rather what we are all hoping for is further progress toward deep reductions of offensive nuclear weapons.

In order to have arms control agreements that work, it seems to me that you need three factors. One, the agreement negotiations are ongoing in Geneva, as the gentleman from Michigan pointed out. The Soviets have tabled a new proposal. I don't know the contents of it, but I am optimistic that progress can be made on the agreements themselves. And the discussion we have had today indicates how important it is to have those agreements be unambiguous.

Second, you need verification protocol so both sides are convinced that the other side is complying with the agreement.

But, third, you need a record of compliance; that is, if there is verification means, and one side or the other is not in compliance

with the agreement, then there has to be some response, it would seem to me, in order to make sure that both sides understand that it is not just having an agreement and not just having verification, but that there is a history of compliance.

CRITICISM OF SOVIET RECORD OF COMPLIANCE

It seems to me that despite the alleged ambiguity, that there is at least one, and perhaps more, areas where there has been noncompliance by the Soviets. The most glaring and least ambiguous of them is not adhering to the numerical sublimit of zero for new ICBM's.

As Mr. Mobbs pointed out, the agreement is very clear that a 5-percent increase in either length, diameter, throw weight, or launch weight is the limit under which one would suggest that a new missile or a different missile is a modification of an existing one. In the case of the SS-25, although we may argue about the exact amount—that the throw weight is substantially more than 5 percent greater than the SS-13—and, therefore, cannot be argued to be a modification of the SS-13; and exceeds, therefore, the numerical sublimit of zero for a new missile. There are some 72 of these.

So, I believe the President's response is appropriate. We are going to put the Soviets on notice, when we come up to a constraint—namely the 131st B-52 with ALCM's—we are not going to be constrained to meet that limit unless Soviet behavior changes, and they get within the treaty constraints.

So, it seems to me, rather than the U.S. Congress saying we will, under any circumstances, require or urge the administration to comply regardless of Soviet compliance, we ought to be saying compliance is important. We support the administration putting the Soviets on notice that, if they do not get into compliance, we will not feel constrained to comply. And I think that that would be a positive kind of signal at a time when the negotiations in Geneva are taking place.

I plan to oppose this resolution because I don't feel it will be a positive factor in assisting us in the negotiations, and I am hopeful that my colleagues will join me in that opposition.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Berman.

Mr. BERMAN. Mr. Mobbs, I have a question. You apparently said in the beginning of your answers to Mr. Solarz's questions that prior to 1981 the Standing Consultative Commission had not resolved or been asked to resolve disputes between the United States and the Soviet positions.

Mr. MOBBS. That is not precisely what I recall saying. What I recall saying is that, prior to 1981, I am not aware of any instance in which the United States had concluded that the Soviets were in violation of their obligations, and were seeking to get a correction of violations. There were instances prior to 1981 when the United States had questions about Soviet behavior, and did raise those questions.

Mr. BERMAN. You are hanging your distinction on the difference between a conclusion about a violation and a question about compliance?

Mr. MOBBS. That is right.

The SCC institutionally is incapable of resolving disputes of fact, disputes of law, disputes of policy or disputes of treaty interpretation where the two governments involved have diametrically opposite views.

Mr. BERMAN. Was there—are you aware of a belief prior to 1981 that under SALT I the Soviets had violated that agreement?

Mr. MOBBS. I am not aware of such a belief.

The point is, the SCC has certain functions for which it is well suited, and there are other matters for which I don't think it was ever intended. And among the former categories, of course, are such matters as procedural issues concerning counting rules, dismantlement procedures, exchanges of information that may be required under the terms of various treaties, and so forth.

In that regard, the SCC does have a useful role to play, and has played a useful role.

SALT COMPLIANCE DOES NOT PRECLUDE DEEP CUTS

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, a number of the points have been made, and I don't want to belabor this issue. I think there should be a specific response to the statement of the gentleman from Michigan, the ranking minority member, where he says that we are suggesting that the SALT II limits and sublimits on launchers and bombers are a substitute for dramatic reductions in strategic weapons, as being discussed at Geneva now.

I don't believe the chairman has ever suggested—there is nothing in this resolution to suggest, and there is no one among the supporters of this resolution that suggests that those limits in the unratified SALT II treaty are substitutes for proceeding. It totally defies logic, and I cannot understand why an administration that professes its keen interest in achieving a verifiable and substantial reduction in strategic weapons would seem to put such little weight on what limits are now contained in the SALT I and SALT II agreements. I have to say it creates an impression that the substantial reductions the administration professes to be seeking causes me to wonder about the sincerity and intensity of that position.

STATEMENT OF JOHN HAWES, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF POLITICO-MILITARY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. HAWES. I don't believe there is any inconsistency, with respect. The policy of maintaining the SALT provisions has been a policy matter, not a legal matter, for the duration of the administration. It was decided that as an interim basis—we tried to negotiate deep reductions—it would be useful to maintain those provisions of the SALT agreement which the Soviets would also maintain.

Mr. BERMAN. Useful for a reason more than the simple good faith mentioned earlier?

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RELEVANCE OF SALT TO STRATEGIC STABLITY

Mr. HAWES. It establishes a useful external framework for the negotiations. It was deemed useful as an interim.

Let us recall that the SALT agreement was drafted in the early seventies, following SALT I, and outlined in 1974, concluded in 1979. It was withdrawn from the Senate prior to ratification by a previous administration.

By the time you came to the first enunciation of an interim restraint policy, the treaty was quite old in its basic outlines. More years have passed. We all understand that whatever the flaws and inadequacies of the particular treaty, they have grown with time.

The number of warheads the Soviets had in the mid-seventies doubled by the end of the seventies; it has added another 4,000 or 5,000 warheads since then. So, the relevance of the treaty to the strategic problems of stability is even less now than it was then.

We have continued to prolong the period of this interim restraint. And as the President made clear last night, we continue to look at Soviet behavior both in the negotiations in Geneva and in their compliance with past agreements as factors in our own determination of what we are going to do in the future.

It would not seem to me to be useful to attempt to legislate compliance with a particular past agreement unratified, and now, I think you will agree, obsolete. That has been a policy matter in an effort to form a framework for negotiations with the Soviets, if possible, to bring leverage on the Soviets to comply and to negotiate more seriously.

As a matter of legislation, and therefore as a matter of inflexibility, it deprives the administration and the United States negotiators of the ability to act flexibly in a future situation.

CALL FOR CLARIFICATION OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hawes, let me just state that the legislation here before us is a strong policy statement, not a law. There is no inflexibility in it. As a matter of fact, the resolve clause makes it clear we would continue the interim restraint only as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

What is confusing it seems to me, is where are we now? Are we still practicing interim restraint? Do we go by the President's policy prior to May 27, or the policy procurement of May 27, the President's subsequent statement of June 11? I gather from what was said last night that we are back to where we were prior May 27. But the President has not restricted his options.

Well, this resolution doesn't change any of that.

Mr. HAWES. The United States remains in technical compliance with the provisions. The President has not in any way changed his position.

Chairman FASCELL. The June 11 statement was not a change or clarification of the President's May 27 statement?

Mr. HAWES. I would not regard it as a change, but as a very clear statement of our intentions to watch the Soviets very closely.

Chairman FASCELL. Well, then, it is very difficult to argue with the proposition that we resolve, in the form a of strong policy state-

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ment, that the United States continue that policy as long as the Soviets do likewise; and that is all this resolution says.

Mr. MOBBS. Mr. Chairman, may I add a word?

Chairman FASCELL. Yes, sir.

NEW SOVIET PROPOSALS FALL OUTSIDE SALT FRAMEWORK

Mr. MOBBS. First, with respect to Mr. Hawes' point that the SALT II Treaty has become more and more obsolete as a framework, it is instructive to note that, judging from the Soviets' proposals in Geneva, the Soviets themselves recognize the obsolescence of SALT II.

The proposal that they have on the table, and that Mr. Gorbachev announced last January, has nothing at all to do with SALT II. It is a somewhat more similar framework to that which the United States has been advocating since 1982.

Second, it is important to take note of the fact that the President has also said, as part of his recent decision, that the United States will not deploy any more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or any more ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

My view is that that framework is a much better framework for both countries to adhere to than the obsolete framework of SALT II. And even under SALT II, the Soviets, by 1994, could have as many as 16,000 warheads; whereas, in terms of total weapons to be allowed under a new treaty, the Soviet position in the Geneva talks is now fairly similar to the long-standing U.S. proposal for radically lower levels of strategic forces. As we negotiate toward a new agreement, the President's proposition is: Let's not exceed where the Soviets are in strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or ballistic missile warheads.

Chairman FASCELL. That is all fine. But then it takes another agreement.

Mr. MOBBS. Not really. If the Soviets are truly interested in mutual restraint, they can simply stop where they are.

ABANDONMENT OF SALT AND STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Mr. Chairman, would you yield?

Mr. Mobbs, this is a point that is bothering me. You take two different positions totally opposed to each other to try to come to the rationale of what the President has done.

You indicated before, and just again now in response to the Chairman, that if the Soviets are in compliance, the total number of weapons that they have available is lower than they would be if they are not in compliance. And you said that there would be somewhere between 4,000 and 5,000 ahead by the middle of the 1990's, of where they would be if they did not stay within the bounds of SALT II.

And yet, you are telling us that we should abandon SALT II, take the cap off and have no cap whatsoever. So there is no inhibiting factor on the Soviets at all. And since we have no replacement to SALT II, we can't even anticipate in the short term any inhibiting factor.

How can you ask us to abandon, if they don't stay? Compliance—and I think Mr. Hamilton made a valid point, that the compliance

violations may be pushing against the absolute upper limits. And I agree that they have probably overstated the case for the SS–25. But if there is no replacement and they push the upper edge and continue to do it, at least there is still a cap.

We have stayed, to some degree, within parity limits within them. Suppose the cap is removed. They feel no compunction whatsoever because there is no SALT. For whatever perception that brings in the world community, there is no SALT II Treaty. They move out smartly and we continue to stay within our limits, due, as you said, to economic and other constraints, and we wind up having now fallen substantially below where we wanted to be, which is parity.

SALT was not a build-down when it was negotiated. Rather, it was a slow-down of buildup. Am I correct?

IMPACT OF SALT ON SOVIET STRATEGIC FORCE LEVELS

Mr. MOBBS. I am not sure I would agree. I would agree that it was a buildup.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. Was it not a slowdown of buildup; limiting the number of new weapons systems, to a small factor?

Mr. MOBBS. We have no evidence whatsoever that the SALT II Treaty in any way slowed down the programs that the Soviets already had in train at the time.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. You said if they stayed within compliance of SALT II, they would have 4,000 to 5,000 less missiles by the middle of 1990 than they would have if they went out of compliance.

Now you are saying it is not a slowdown of the buildup. Which is it?

Mr. MOBBS. I didn't say that.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. You did.

Mr. MOBBS. What I said was that if the Soviets chose to stay in compliance with SALT II, that by 1990 we estimate they would have about 13,000 total strategic weapons; whereas, if they chose not to stay within SALT II, by 1990 they might have between 14,000 and 15,000—not a very big difference.

Mr. SMITH of Florida. You made a statement about 17,000 to 21,000.

Mr. MOBBS. This is our estimate for 1994. The uncertainty is a little bigger. But under SALT II, by 1994 they would probably have about 16,000 total strategic weapons. And if they did not comply with SALT II, by 1994 they could have, we estimate, between 17,000 and 21,000 weapons.

Again, it is a larger range of uncertainty than for 1990. But the conclusion I draw is that there is not a dramatic difference with or without SALT II. Even if the Soviets went to the upper edge of our estimate, by 1994, it is hard to see what the significance of 4,000 or 5,000 warheads would be when the Soviet were already going to be at 16,000 or 17,000 anyway.

SALT IMPOSES LIMITS ON ESCALATING ARMS RACE

Mr. SMITH of Florida. That is the best argument I have heard for continuing the escalating arms race, because the numbers make no

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difference at this point anyway. And once you get past the certain number, it is all totally irrelevant.

Why are we racing this way? And you have just said it very well. What is the difference? What the heck? After all, 4,000 or 5,000 nuclear warheads, in the context of 20,000, it is just a spit in the ocean.

This is the madness that we are attempting—everybody across the board—to stop, this attitude that a few more thousand missiles mean nothing. They all mean something. And the more you have, eventually the more there will be the pressure to use them, because you have got so many you can afford to toss a few.

There is a pressure that builds as the numbers multiply. And the parity is what keeps—or at least I thought MAD was what we had at one point as the basis of our arms control and our safety net, so to speak, and that was, as long as the numbers were in parity, there was no such pressure, because every response could be answered with an equal counter response.

But if you are talking about SALT being removed, and there is a large factor of additional missiles being able to be speculated upon as coming into the Soviet arsenal, while at the same time admitting that we would be at a much lower number, you have already removed the parity and, therefore, the basis of MAD.

Are you trying to do that in order to justify star wars?

Mr. MOBBS. The President firmly believes there are too many nuclear weapons in the world. And, in that respect, I am sure we could agree with you up to a point. But that is why we are proposing to reduce warheads rather substantially to a limit of 6,000. The Soviets mention the number of 6,000, too, although they define it in a different way.

The conclusion I am making is, there is no dramatic difference with or without SALT II, because SALT II is no real constraint. We should be interested in achieving real constraints. SALT II doesn't give us that.

Chairman FASCELL. We will recess until 2 o'clock.

[Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m., the same day.]

AFTERNOON SESSION

Chairman FASCELL. The committee will come to order.

The next person to be recognized is Mr. Bereuter.

SUGGESTED AMENDMENT CALLING FOR SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH SALT PROVISIONS

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will see if I can direct my comments and questions—and the first comment I would make is whether or not it is acceptable or desirable, hopefully both, to change the words in section 2 to substitute the word provisions for numerical sublimits.

It is my understanding that if that would be the case, it is exactly what the President said last night. In other words, the President shall continue to adhere to the provisions of the SALT agreement as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

LIMITS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES

My questions are primarily about the strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. It is my understanding that the ceiling for SALT II is set at 2,250, and the United States, according to an unclassified report given to us by the Congressional Research Service, had total SNDV's at 1,931, Soviet count was at 2,477, in excess of the ceiling, 2,250, and that at the point we had a discussion on this matter with the Soviets a year ago, they were at 2,504, and after that, they proceeded to a still higher level of 2,520.

Now, I am trying to understand the difference between numerical limits and numerical sublimits. I was told by committee staff just after we recessed this morning that the overall limits of 2,250 to be agreed to in the treaty itself, but that the sublimits were to be set by separate agreement after the treaty had been agreed to, ratified.

I guess I would ask our witnesses, either one, is that the case, that the overall limit, numerical limit of 2,250 for the delivery vehicles had to be specifically approved in the ratified treaty?

LIMITS AND SUBLIMITS SET IN SALT TREATY

Mr. MOBBS. Let me try and answer the question, and clarify some of these numbers, because they do get a bit confusing, after a while.

Had the treaty gone into force, it would have required the Soviets to reduce their total strategic forces to a level of 2,250 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles over a period of time that was stated in the treaty.

That number was agreed to. The treaty also had certain sublimits underneath that, sublimits on MIRV'd ICBM's, MIRV'd ballistic missile totals, and MIRV'd SNDV's of all types, these were nested subceilings.

Those numbers were also agreed upon, and would have become mandatory had the treaty entered into force.

Mr. BERREUTER. Is there any difference between the vehicle numbers and those sublimits?

Mr. MOBBS. The sublimits permit no more than 820 MIRV'd ICBM's, no more than a total of 1,200 MIRV'd ICBM's and SLBM's, and no more than 1,320 MIRV'd ba''istic missiles and ALCM-carrying heavy bombers. Those were all within the total ceiling of 2,250 SNDV's.

Mr. BERREUTER. Is there any difference in the level of commitment, the place the commitment was made on the vehicle numbers versus the subcategories?

LEVEL OF SOVIET STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES

Mr. MOBBS. If I correctly understand your question, the answer would be no. The numbers that I just mentioned were all agreed upon at the time the treaty was signed.

Now, there is an additional point I need to make to clarify the situation. In 1981, when the United States and the Soviet Union made reciprocal commitments not to undercut the unratified treaty, part of that commitment required the Soviets not to exceed

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the number of SNDV's that they had at the time the SALT II Treaty was signed, which was 2,504.

It is that political commitment that we have found the Soviets to be in violation of, because they have exceeded the 2,504 number.

Mr. BEREUTER. Although they are perhaps now back under that limit, according to CRS?

Mr. MOBBS. I don't think our current estimates would be strictly in accordance with the numbers that you just mentioned.

The best information I have is that the Soviets are still over the 2,504 number by maybe 15 or 20.

DISTINCTION BETWEEN SUBLIMIT/OVERALL LIMIT COMPLIANCE

Mr. BEREUTER. What is your understanding of the importance of the distinction in section 2, which refers to sublimits versus limits?

Do you believe, for example, that the use of sublimits excludes strategic vehicles, SNDV's?

Mr. MOBBS. The sublimits consist of SNDV's, but you could still increase the number of total SNDV's, and still be within the subceilings.

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes; so we are talking about the subcategories of this definition, but this does nothing to address the overall number of delivery vehicles; is that correct?

Mr. MOBBS. That is correct.

Mr. BEREUTER. If we in fact had it changed to say limits and sublimits, it would cover both?

Mr. MOBBS. Yes; it would appear to. I am not making a legal judgment, but it would appear to.

LIMITED AUTHORITY OF STANDING CONSULTATIVE COMMISSION

Mr. BEREUTER. Relatedly, why has the SCC, which addresses SALT compliance issues, been unable to correct, or to hold down the Soviets' expansion beyond the original limit and beyond the subsequently agreed to limit?

Mr. MOBBS. As I have suggested in our session this morning, the SCC does not have within its power the ability to require or force either country to adopt a particular line of action, or to force or require either country to honor the commitments that it has made.

The SCC is purely a voluntary arrangement in which each country participates according to the policy positions that are formulated back in their respective capitals—and in the present situation, the Soviets have steadfastly maintained that everything they have done has been strictly in accordance with the SALT agreements. Therefore, there is no discussion, there is no room for discussion about Soviet violations.

They simply contend that there are not any Soviet violations. We have attempted in excess of 3 years, spanning 11 sessions of the SCC, to engage the Soviets in a serious and detailed discussion about these issues, and invited them to give us the information that would enable us to make our own judgments about the claims they have made. But so far, that has not proven to be productive, because the Soviets simply maintain there are not any violations.

CRITICISM OF RESOLUTION'S SUBSECTIONS

Mr. BEREUTER. Now, if I could address a few comments to the chairman, and Mr. Solarz and Mr. Hyde, who seem to be working on some sort of a compromise, I still have my question about whether it would not "be more appropriate" to insert the word "provisions" as opposed to "numerical sublimits". But looking at the findings section, section 1(b) and its seven subsections, it seems to me that some of these are unnecessarily contentious.

Subsection 7, it seems to me, overcites the view of the European allies, because you are grouping all European allies together, and characterized as highly detrimental to their security.

I don't think that is an accurate indication of all of the European allies together. I understand there is some discrepancy perhaps about subsection 5. I believe that in the case of subsection 2, which talks about a breakout from the SALT agreements, it gives the impression by the wording of that subsection that we are talking about a prospective breakout, and many people believe there has already been a breakout.

Certainly, people disagree about whether the SALT agreements in subsection 3 do provide important measures for monitoring Soviet nuclear force deployment and verification methods for existing and future agreements, and certainly, that is a point of substantial disagreement, so if we are looking for something of what is an accurate indication of what people might agree on in this committee and what the situation is, I believe we ought to have some changes in the findings section, and if any of my colleagues would like to respond, I would be pleased to hear their views.

I yield to my colleague from Illinois.

CRITICISM OF RESOLUTION'S FOCUS ON SUBLIMIT COMPLIANCE

Mr. HYDE. I want to compliment my colleague from Nebraska, and tell him that he has hit the fatal flaw with this resolution, in suggesting that confining the final clause to numerical sublimits is a distortion of the whole SALT process.

Now, I am going to ask Mr. Mobbs or Mr. Hawes a question. The bottom line after all the whereases and the findings and the historical recitation and the nuances and subnuances, says the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

So, this whole SALT process has now focused on numerical sublimits. As I take it, that means we are not able to add that extra 131st B–52 with air-launched cruise missiles because then, we would exceed by one the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreement, and while we are barred from doing what the President said, unless the Soviets mend their ways, he is going to do this fall, they are not barred from violating the numerical limits as distinguished from sublimits, and so they are off the hook on SS–25 and other non-MIRV'd weapons, which the sublimits only apply to MIRV'd weapons, so we are restrained from doing what the President said he would do, as long as they observe sublimits on MIRV'd weapons, and meanwhile, they are free to violate the numerical limits.

Mr. BEREUTER. You can distinguish if you like, and furthermore, they are free to continue encrypting, in violation of SALT, and free

to continue with their radar facility, as long as they live within the numerical sublimits.

RESOLUTION ADDRESSES SELECTED PROVISIONS OF SALT

Mr. HYDE. As long as we continue talking to ourselves at the SCC as we have over the years.

Would either of you gentlemen or both of you gentlemen explain the significance, the real meaning, and why it is a lousy deal for us to accept the notion that the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreement as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

What would that do to us?

Mr. MOBBS. You asked whether or not your statement was correct, and the answer is yes, your statement was correct; the Soviets would be free, as far as this resolution is concerned, to violate the overall limit on the number of SNDV's, as they are doing now, and continue to be free to violate the other provisions which they are now violating, which go to the heart of the treaty.

Sometimes there is a suggestion that the only important things about the treaty are the sublimits on MIRV's, and I simply don't accept that. There are many provisions of the treaty that are of the essence of the treaty, and I would say that the Soviets are in violation of three right now.

Therefore, the import of this resolution would seem to be that the President must be bound to observe certain selected provisions of the treaty, while we disregard the other important provisions that the Soviets are violating.

Mr. Hawes also has a word to add on that point.

Mr. HAWES. I think it is characteristic, looking at the text of the resolution, that the word "sub" appears so many times. It is a highly selective approach to SALT compliance, in that the resolution picks out the sublimits in the agreement, chooses to ignore the other provisions, such as encryption, new types and the political commitment to maintain the overall level of SNDV's.

It happens to be the one limit where the Soviets have not been in violation—the numerical sublimits—where we have not accused them. It is the one area where we have raised the question of our own programs possibly going beyond SALT limits with the 131st B-52's, an unusually selective piece and very damaging in its implications.

Mr. HYDE. It is the first cousin of unilateral disarmament.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Will the gentleman yield to me.

Mr. HYDE. Yes.

Mr. BEREUTER. I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Thank you. Why does the failure to mention, Mr. Hawes, those other areas which you just mentioned imply that the Soviets no longer shall be constrained by the language of the treaty, simply because this document fails to mention them?

It doesn't seem to me that the failure to mention those areas in the resolution frees the Soviets to violate, or continue to violate as they have under some circumstances, those provisions.

Mr. HAWES. The intent is not to recount the situation, but to impose or express the will of the Congress that there should be imposed limits to restrain our own actions in a particular field.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. And their own actions.

Mr. HAWES. Exactly, so it is material how you define the field where their actions and our actions are relevant, and the text as written narrows that field to a very precise area and ignores specific areas of the SALT agreement.

Mr. HYDE. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Chairman FASCELL. Let's do it one at a time.

Mr. BEREUTER. Reclaiming my time, I would say we can solve that problem of narrowing the field by suggesting provisions of SALT versus numerical sublimits.

I yield to the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Will the gentleman allow me to respond to that?

I am not sure I have a problem with that. I just object to the Administration suggesting that the resolution implies something it doesn't imply, and it somehow is a second cousin to unilateral disarmament. Nothing could be further from the truth. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

SOVIET VIOLATIONS NOT ADDRESSED IN RESOLUTION

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hyde, do you want to speak for a while?

Mr. HYDE. I would like to.

Is this on my own time?

All right. My contention is that the focus, the punchline, the bottom line of this resolution is a restraint only on this Government, and is telling us that as long as the Soviet Union continues to behave in one limit, one narrow area—namely, numerical sublimits, which apply only to MIRV'd weapons—then we are barred from adding one more air-launched cruise missile on a B-52.

Now, it would seem to me we ought to look at the whole picture and not focus on one narrow aspect of SALT. And when I say "unilateral disarmament," I am saying if the Soviet Union wants to have new intercontinental ballistic missiles in contravention to SALT, and encrypt telemetry in contravention to SALT, and wants to have a new phased array radar, in contravention to the ABM treaty, we certainly ought to be permitted a little wiggle room to provide some incentive to them to get back in line.

You are taking that away from us by saying, no, we have got to observe the sublimits, as long as they observe the sublimits. Of course, there is more to the treaty than that, but is this Congress going to focus on what Reagan wants to do to provide some incentives to get them back in line and say, oh, no, you don't, you can't do it as long as the Soviets adhere to the sublimits? Meanwhile, the Soviets are over here violating the letter and the spirit of the treaty. That is the first cousin of unilateral disarmament.

I would like to ask Mr. Mobbs and Mr. Hawes to comment on the imbalance, the lack of equity, the unwisdom of strapping us into this chair while the Soviet Union is free to roam all over the lot and our only recourse is to go to a sterile, empty institution called

the Standing Consultative Commission. We can't threaten the Soviets with adding another air-launched cruise missile on a plane, because you won't let us do that. We go to General Ellis and talk and talk and talk, while the Soviets stonewall. That is not my idea of arms control.

I ask you both to comment on my remark.

Mr. MOBBS. Mr. Hawes has already quite correctly pointed out that this reflects what appears to be a highly imbalanced approach, because it singles out the one area where we have not yet found the Soviets to be in violation and suggests that this is the most important area. In fact, there seems to be an underlying assumption here that the SALT II subceilings are, for some reason, the most important part of the treaty; and therefore, as long as that one set of limits has not been violated, it doesn't matter what other provisions of the treaty have been violated. And, of course, we don't agree with that at all.

First, it is our judgment that if you are going to be serious about arms control, we have got to be serious about compliance.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Where is it implicit that the other provisions no longer matter because of this provision?

Mr. MOBBS. There is an implied message that the most important issue is the SALT subceilings.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. How is it implicit——

ALLOCATION OF TIME

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I love to hear Mr. Kostmayer talk, but he has broken in. It is my time.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Chairman, point of order. I have a point of order. I will state it briefly, and then be quiet.

The time of the gentleman from Illinois has come and gone. He has spoken a great deal, and some of the rest of us would like a turn.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. The Chair has been lenient about the time.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. More than lenient to the gentleman from Illinois.

Chairman FASCELL. I will return to regular order now with respect to members who have not been called. But, before doing that, I will let Mr. Hyde finish his statement.

Mr. HYDE. Is the Chair saying that this was my time?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Again?

Chairman FASCELL. Yes, I did recognize you.

Mr. HYDE. That is my recollection.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, point of information.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Isn't it a fact that the gentleman from Illinois has now been recognized at least twice on his own time, while some of us——

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Three times the gentleman from Illinois has been recognized.

Mr. WEISS. Is that correct?

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. Gentlemen, gentlemen.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HYDE. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.

Chairman FASCELL. If you gentlemen would let the Chair respond, the answer is that the gentleman from Illinois has been recognized more times in this discussion than normally is the case, and I have allowed that to occur, with him and others, in order to get a full discussion. But if that is going to cause difficulties, I will now recognize only those members who have not been heard until such time as we come around again.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Chairman, I have a brief point of order.

The chairman stated the gentleman from Illinois, my friend, has been recognized three times. I have no problem with that. I object to when I interrupted for a question the gentleman from Illinois jumped all over me.

You have been recognized three times. You ought to let another member interrupt for a question.

Chairman FASCELL. If it is his time, he can choose whether to or not.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I understand.

Mr. HYDE. I appreciate the courtesy of the chairman, and I am sorry Mr. Kostmayer's feathers are ruffled. And I yield back. And I won't burden anyone with this microphone again.

Thank you.

CRITICISM OF ADMINISTRATION'S ARMS CONTROL POLICY

Chairman FASCELL. OK, Mr. Weiss.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, perhaps it would be in order to get back to essentials. We are discussing the nuclear arms race and the nuclear precipice and how all humanity can be blown to pieces; and here we are engaged only in an argument as to how you can best cover up the administration's determination to blow the SALT II agreements out of the water.

Now, it seems to me that the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency of this administration is really hardly entitled to use that name any longer. The rest of the world, as well as the people who negotiated these agreements on both sides of the aisle, are absolutely stunned that this administration, after 5½ years of having done everything possible not to arrive at new agreements, is determined to undo old agreements.

Whatever questions there may be about whether the Soviets are or are not violating certain other aspects of the SALT II agreement—and there are some serious questions as to whether, that is so or not—they ought to be addressed in the appropriate forum. That was the thrust of Mr. Hamilton's questioning of the witnesses.

But as to the limitation, the sublimitations, there is just no question but that both sides have been adhering to them, and that the first clear violation would be if the President followed through on his present determination to take another B-52 and load it up with the air-launched cruise missiles. That is what the argument is all about. The issue is not unilateral disarmament but a policy that is bringing us closer and closer to an uncontrolled nuclear arms race.

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I compliment the chairman for his determination to have a congressional policy statement—in the form of this resolution—saying that we are opposed to the administration and to the President undermining the efforts of the past 40 years in an attempt to try to "win" in the nuclear arms race. And it is too bad that certain members seem to think that party loyalty dictates that they defend whatever idiocy the administration comes forward with.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. All right.

Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, I would like to offer a substitute to the resolution.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Some of us spent some time, with the help of the majority and minority staff, over the last few hours——

REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL DEBATE

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman, point of order.

I understand that there are members who have not yet been heard who wish to make a statement. Would it be possible to get that round out of the way before we have a second round of comments and questions?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Weiss, I just asked if anybody else wanted to speak.

Mr. WEISS. Some of us missed that.

Mr. DORNAN. I missed it.

Mr. SOLARZ. I don't want to preempt anyone from making a statement. I had been under the impression no one wanted to.

Chairman FASCELL. I didn't see Mr. Dornan.

Mr. Dornan, you are recognized next, and then Mr. Kostmayer.

Mr. DORNAN. I have been sitting here for a while, but I was south of Mr. Hyde, so you are forgiven for not seeing me.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Point of order, Mr. Chairman.

Let the record show it was the gentleman from California who said that—not the gentleman from Pennsylvania.

Mr. DORNAN. All the more reason why the distinguished gentleman from Pennsylvania should not play David to that Goliath.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Remember who won that battle, Mr. Dornan.

Mr. DORNAN. One final observation: Goliath took note of that and has gone off to gird his loins for the next encounter en garde.

UNITED STATES MAY STAY WITHIN SALT SUBCEILINGS

There was an article in the paper this morning that really makes some of the discussion we have had here today moot, I think, and it comes out of an arms control meeting that our distinguished colleague, Mrs. Byron from Maryland, was chairing.

The article, by Walter Pincus, points out that if one of the Poseidon subs is in fact dismantled before September–October of this year, with 16 holes in it, 16 missile holes, then the President can deploy 16 more B–52 bombers starting with number 131, and this would extend the life of this nonratified treaty called SALT II until the summer of next year.

What is all the tension about, if that fact is true? And do you read it that way, Mr. Mobbs?

Mr. MOBBS. If the President did decide to dismantle an additional Poseidon submarine, that would in effect give us, under the SALT II provisions, a credit, if you will, of 16 MIRV'd launchers with which to do something else.

In that case, we could deploy 16 more heavy bombers equipped for ALCMs or some other type of MIRV'd launcher, and be in technical compliance with SALT II.

But there has been no decision about whether to dismantle an additional Poseidon or not.

Mr. HAWES. The President was quite clear last night a decision has not been made one way or the other on that issue.

Mr. DORNAN. On just the whole idea of SALT II, Mr. Hawes.

Mr. HAWES. That is right; and, therefore, also specifically on the question of a Poseidon.

Mr. DORNAN. If it is true what Mr. Paul Nitze said, his feeling is we will dismantle one of the Poseidons. That leaves 16 opportunities—correct?—to put ALCM's on B–52's?

Mr. MOBBS. I want to be sure we are speaking of the same terms. We are speaking of an additional Poseidon over and above the two the President has already stated will be dismantled.

Yes; in that event, that would give us a credit of another 16 MIRV'd launchers, with which we could deploy if we wanted, 16 more heavy bombers equipped with ALCM's, and still be within the SALT subceilings.

URGING SOVIET ACCOUNTABILITY

Mr. DORNAN. Could I ask you gentlemen, then, for one more observation? That is, the way we are framing this whole discussion in America, in its broadest terms, Hawaii to Puerto Rico, we seem to be actually telling the leaders in the Soviet Union to go ahead and break out and build to the maximum potential of their command society, if we decide to set aside this unratified treaty that we believe they are cheating on.

Shouldn't we be framing this in a way that puts a burden on the Soviet Union to explain to Europe, if not the whole world, why they should be able to break out and press their economy even more seriously than it is burdened now, to just arm beyond their present arming to the teeth?

Could I get your observations on that?

I am through, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. MOBBS. Well, I think it certainly would be helpful if we had some mechanism for forcing the Soviet Union to be accountable to public opinion for the actions that it takes or the actions that it threatens to take. Since we have no such mechanism, obviously we have to make our own best judgment however we can.

As I stated this morning, our best judgment is that there would not be any significant difference between what the Soviets would do under SALT II and what they would not do under SALT II. The fact is that they have a rather substantial buildup already programmed. It is going on now. It will continue. It will continue with SALT II. That is not to say therefore that in the absence of SALT

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II the Soviets are going to undertake some dramatic new force buildup, because we don't believe that is the case.

SOVIET BEHAVIOR WILL INFLUENCE U.S. POLICY

Mr. HAWES. The President is very clear. We intend to use the time between now and fall to look at Soviet behavior to try to make it clear to them that their behavior will influence our decision about what the Soviets could do in the absence of SALT. It is a matter of projection and some speculation and there is a range of different estimates. We presented some of those estimates this morning on what they might do.

Military programs are not free in the Soviet Union, no more than they are free in this country. They have to make priority judgments also as to how they spend their resources. I would be skeptical that they would invest to the high end of those possibilities simply in terms of their priorities.

Chairman FASCELL. That is a nice, skeptical answer.

CONSTRAINTS IMPOSED BY SALT II

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Isn't SALT II about constraints? It is not about constraints?

Mr. MOBBS. My own view is SALT II is simply a reflection, in the form of a treaty, of what the Soviet force building program already was. In that sense, no; it is not about constraints.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. It doesn't constrain the rates, doesn't it constrain the rates of growth?

Mr. MOBBS. I know of no evidence to that effect; no.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. And what about the weapons that have been destroyed?

Mr. MOBBS. The weapons that have been destroyed have been replaced by far more capable, far more accurate, far more destructive weapons, systems that carry far more warheads than the ones that were destroyed.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. How could you change the establishment of limits, numerical limits?

Mr. MOBBS. In the case of SALT II the numerical limits were placed at a level far beyond where either country was at that time in order that substantial growth could occur.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. How about the sublimits?

Mr. MOBBS. The same thing is true.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. There are still limits aren't there, admittedly there are limits beyond where the country was at that time?

Mr. MOBBS. The question is whether they are limits that actually constrain any growth of military capability or not. In my judgment, they do not. It is precisely the MIRV'd subceilings which, because they are so high, will allow the Soviets by 1990 to have in excess of 12,000 strategic weapons, and by 1994, if they wish, in excess of 16,000. This is under SALT II. I am not sure what kind of constraints that is except in the most formal sense.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Are there not more limits than there would be without any treaty?

Mr. MOBBS. Mr. Hawes rightly said it is a matter of some speculation what the Soviet Union would or would not do if the treaty were not being observed.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. If the treaty were not being observed, there would be no limits?

Mr. MOBBS. As I said this morning——

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Do you agree with that or disagree with that?

Mr. MOBBS. What I think is that in the absence of SALT II, the Soviets would not do anything substantially different than they would do in the presence of SALT II. If you want to ask me whether the absence of a treaty means the absence of legal limitations, the answer is yes, but that is a very formalistic approach.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. The treaty by its nature is a formalistic agreement between two countries.

Mr. MOBBS. The question is, what the limits accomplish and in this case, the limits accomplish very little.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Mr. Dornan indicated we really are saying to the Soviet Union, go ahead and break out. Why is that not so?

UNITED STATES MUST RESPOND TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Mr. MOBBS. I understood him to be saying that this is the way the issue sometimes gets framed. No; I don't think that is what we are saying at all. I think what we are saying is that we made it very clear to the Soviets what our policy was and what the reasons for our policy were with respect to SALT II. The reasons for our policy have not been fulfilled and most disturbingly, our policy was based on reciprocity and the Soviets have not reciprocated. The President has finally been forced to face the question of whether or not that policy, which was not working, should continue in force or whether he should try to make it clearer than apparently has been the case to the Soviets, that their failure to reciprocate cannot go on forever.

ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED WITH SOVIET UNION

Mr. KOSTMAYER. How many arms control agreements do we currently have with the Soviet Union, signed, ratified, including this one, that has not been ratified, but which we both agreed to?

Mr. MOBBS. Well, let's see, we have the ABM Treaty.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. SALT I and II.

Mr. MOBBS. Is your question how many arms control agreements are there whether they have been ratified or not?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Including this one which has not been ratified, counting this one?

Mr. MOBBS. ABM Treaty, SALT I, SALT II.

Mr. HAWES. You have the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Are you in favor of that?

Mr. HAWES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. ABM Treaty?

Mr. HAWES. Yes.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Do you favor that?

Mr. HAWES. Of course.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. You do favor the ABM? Does the President know that?

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Mr. HAWES. With respect, sir.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I beg your pardon. He does know?

Mr. HAWES. Absolutely.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. That is Mr. Adelman's position, he favors ABM?

Mr. HAWES. Yes, sir.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Good.

Mr. HAWES. You have the Limited Test Ban Treaty; you have the Biological Warfare Convention; you have the Geneva Protocols, 1925; you have the Outer Space Treaty.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. You favor SALT I and the Outer Space Treaty as well?

Mr. HAWES. SALT I is only the ABM component at this point.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Do you think that these treaties serve some political purpose? Rather, the negotiations serve some political purpose which is to our advantage?

Mr. HAWES. Bilateral purpose, you mean? Purpose in addition to the specific purpose of the treaty?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Yes.

Mr. HAWES. I do believe they do.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. What purpose is that?

Mr. HAWES. I think there is a virtue in the process of negotiations in demonstrating that you can have a dialog between two parties which are otherwise competitive.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Do you think they serve to placate public opinion, neutralize opposition to arms control agreement?

Mr. HAWES. There has never been any secret that public opinion has been a major factor in everybody's approach to these issues, and has necessarily been so. I would oppose, I think any serious person would oppose, designing policies for that reason.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

VALUE OF ADHERENCE TO NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS

Chairman FASCELL. Let's see if I can just recap something here. We have violations of the provisions and the limits of SALT II and no violations of the sublimits, is that correct?

Mr. MOBBS. As I stated earlier, yes, we have not yet determined the Soviets to be in violation of the MIRV'd subceilings.

Chairman FASCELL. And now what you are saying is there is no value in continuing restraint with respect to the sublimits despite the fact that there is no evidence of any violations. You are telling us we should no longer abide by restraints of any kind—whether they are effectual or ineffectual is a different point—because of the fact that SALT II has been violated and therefore ought to be scrapped.

Mr. HAWES. I was trying to make a more precise point, Mr. Chairman, which is the operative paragraph of the resolution. As I see it, section 2, makes the triggering mechanism Soviet compliance with the sublimits, which is a very selective portion of the entire——

Chairman FASCELL. That is only part on which you have no evidence of violations?

Mr. HAWES. That is correct.

Chairman FASCELL. Now, what you are saying is, since you are opposed to the resolution, that you don't even want that kind of restraint because it is of no utility.

Mr. HAWES. I was making a very different point. The resolution appears to be drafted to exclude from the triggering mechanism those provisions of the agreement which we found the Soviets in violation.

ADMINISTRATION POSITION ON SALT COMPLIANCE

Chairman FASCELL. If we do that, you see, then you would have the President's position, which is there is no SALT II and never is going to be. He has already made that statement. In other words, the violations are the trigger for the abandonment of SALT II.

Mr. HAWES. I thought the President——

Chairman FASCELL. That is the position of the President.

Mr. HAWES. I thought the President was quite clear last night to say that those decisions have not been made. He is watching what the Soviets are doing.

Chairman FASCELL. We are having problems getting a clear policy statement from the administration. But aside from that, what we are getting down to is that, since provisions and general limitations on SALT II have been violated, there is no purpose in trying to retain any constraint with respect to sublimits. Therefore, what you are advocating, whether you call it a breakout or not, is simply to let everybody do what they want to do in terms of build-up and maybe, when we get around to it at Geneva, we will get some type of an agreement. Did I leave something out?

Mr. MOBBS. That is not really the case. First, the President has made crystal clear that our first priority is to negotiate very substantial reductions in Geneva. I might say the Soviets are now saying the same thing.

SIGNIFICANCE OF ADHERENCE TO SALT SUBMLIMITS

Chairman FASCELL. That's fine. But how does our negotiating posture at Geneva relate to restraint on the sublimits of SALT II? If we are going to negotiate a new agreement, how will that relate to the sublimits of the unratified SALT II agreement?

Mr. MOBBS. Obviously we need a new agreement, but implicit in your comments is the assumption that the sublimits themselves currently impose some sort of meaningful restraint and therefore in the answer——

Chairman FASCELL. I didn't say that, I said we have an unratified treaty.

Mr. MOBBS. Well, if the sublimits don't impose any meaningful restraint, then why is it that we are being urged to observe the sublimits themselves, particularly given the fact that the only immediate response to Soviet violations that the President has identified is precisely in this area of subceilings. It is very difficult to create responses to Soviet cheating because we are limited by resources.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Mobbs, your logic falls short because you keep saying that the Soviets would do what they are going to do regardless of SALT sublimits. If you support a theory politically be-

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cause it is not legally binding on anybody, anywhere, you have no legislation, you have no treaty, and therefore, you know you work yourselves right into a circle.

What it boils down to is you don't want any kind of political position that says we ought to have that kind of restraint. You are going to negotiate a new agreement out in Geneva. But meanwhile, in my estimation, anybody can do what they want to do.

Mr. MOBBS. I respectfully disagree, Mr. Chairman. The President has in fact stated his policy on the interim restraint. His policy certainly is to have restraint.

Chairman FASCELL. Name the conditions.

Mr. MOBBS. There are no conditions. The policy is that we will not deploy any more SNDV's or any more ballistic missile warheads than the Soviets do. It is very straightforward.

Chairman FASCELL. If that is the case, what is wrong with saying, let's stay with the sublimits we have until we get a new agreement?

Mr. MOBBS. What is wrong is that the sublimits allow a very substantial increase beyond where the Soviets are. If the Soviets would stop where they are, we would be able to avoid that outcome.

Chairman FASCELL. And, what would you use for pressure with respect to negotiations at Geneva except the unfettered right to build all kinds of weapons whenever?

CURRENT SOVIET PROPOSALS IN GENEVA

Mr. MOBBS. In my mind, the whole question of SALT II has become less and less relevant to what is happening in Geneva. In 1982, it is true that the Soviets were proposing in strategic arms reduction what really amounted to a SALT II Treaty. Their proposal in 1982 was precisely the SALT II with some minor downward adjustments in the ceilings and subceilings.

But today, the situation is quite different. The Soviet proposal on the table in Geneva now has nothing to do with SALT II. It is much more similar in terms of its framework to the approach that we have been advocating since 1982, which is limits on warheads, limits on missiles, and substantial reductions in throw weight. Therefore, I would submit that the presence or absence of these subceilings has very little, if anything, to do with the progress in Geneva.

CONSEQUENCES OF POLICY OF NO RESTRAINT

Chairman FASCELL. Except the psychology of the whole question of disarmament, which has certainly upset and raised a great deal of concern not only in the Congress but among our European allies. Admitting everything that you might say right now is true, until you get a new agreement, what it does psychologically is just say there are no restraints of any kind and what we are going to do is pressure each other in order to reach a potential agreement at Geneva, which up to now has been fruitless.

Mr. Hawes.

CURRENT SOVIET POSITION

Mr. HAWES. I would add to that, Mr. Chairman, within the weeks since the President made his May 27 announcement, that announcement has not stopped the Soviets from coming forward with some very interesting proposals in Geneva on the subject we are talking about—the reduction of strategic forces.

As Mike Mobbs has said, the proposals are far closer to our structure of negotiations, far closer to our structure of reductions than they are to the old SALT formula. The Soviets have not been impeded by what you call the psychological climate, if you will, from coming forward and negotiating.

Chairman FASCELL. I am all for that. I hope we will quit putting those proposals in the press and issue instructions to both sides ordering the negotiators to get down to business. All we're playing with up until now is politics and perceptions, both domestically and internationally.

EFFECT OF RESOLUTION ON GENEVA NEGOTIATIONS

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, in the past, I have supported the no undercut policy of the administration. SALT II has worked to restrain some aspects of the arms race. However, it has not worked all that well in the restraint of the Soviet side, since they have improved their weapons in violation of the treaty and violated it and other agreements over the past several years.

The administration announcement that if violations are not curtailed it will pierce the numerical limitation on launchers to a slight degree has provoked a response that I think is out of proportion. We have not, to the best of my recollection, passed any resolution denouncing Soviet violations. Accordingly, I think the more important question for us to consider is, does a legislative requirement of continued adherence to numerical limitations—in the face of Soviet violations—represent the best position for our own nation?

I believe it is more important to let the Soviets know that the administration means business in order to convince them to lay out their best proposal on the table at Geneva. This they have now evidently done, and the President is now reviewing it.

With such important negotiations now underway, and with the President indicating that it is his intention to try and draw the Soviets into talks about a replacement treaty for SALT II, I caution my colleagues against pulling the rug out from under our negotiating team at this very sensitive time in the Geneva negotiations by adopting this kind of restraining legislation.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. This crisis has been there for a long time. I know you are sincere, but Geneva has been crucial since day one.

Mr. GILMAN. I think that if we put constraints on that negotiation, we will do more harm than good.

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SOLARZ SUBSTITUTE TO RESOLUTION

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Solarz.

Mr. SOLARZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have a substitute resolution which with your permission, if you think it appropriate, I would like to introduce at this time, which might help to focus the discussion.

Mr. BRADY. Substitute offered by Mr. Solarz:

Strike all of the resolving clause and insert section 1 findings.

The Congress finds that—

(1) the constraints on the——

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, can I ask unanimous consent that the substitute be considered as read?

Chairman FASCELL. Without objection, the substitute is considered as read, printed in the record in full, and open for amendment.

[The substitute amendment follows:]

AMENDMENT TO H. CON. RES. 350

Strike out all after the resolving clause and insert:

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

The Congress finds that—

(1) the constraints on the growth of Soviet nuclear forces, especially those involving numerical sublimits, imposed by the SALT arms control agreements serve vital United States national security interests, especially in this time of fiscal austerity;

(2) a failure to adhere to the SALT agreements would result in a significantly increased threat to the United States by allowing the Soviet Union to increase significantly the number of warheads it could have under the SALT agreements and to substitute all of its single-warhead ICBMs and SLBMs with multiple-warhead missiles;

(3) the SALT agreements provide some important measures for monitoring Soviet nuclear force developments and for verification;

(4) the United States and the Soviet Union have not undercut the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements;

(5) although allowing for modernization under which the Soviets have removed over 800 ICBM missiles and replaced them with newer types, the SALT agreements have required the Soviet Union to dismantle over 260 ICBM launchers, dismantle over 240 SLBM launchers, and dismantle 14 Yankee-class nuclear missile-carrying submarines;

(6) the Administration contends that the Soviet Union has violated some of the provisions of the SALT agreements that do not deal with numerical sublimits by taking such steps as deploying more than one new type of ICBM and by excessively encrypting telemetry;

(7) disputes over Soviet compliance with the SALT agreements could be resolved within the Standing Consultative Commission, by the on-going negotiations at Geneva, or by other means; and

(8) our European allies have expressed their special concern over the decision to possibly discontinue United States adherence to the SALT agreements in the future.

SEC. 2. CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO SALT NUMERICAL SUBLIMITS.

The President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise.

Mr. SOLARZ. Mr. Chairman, this substitute is the result of several hours of intensive discussions between some of the people in the majority and some in the minority and staff on both sides of the aisle, as well as the administration. It represents an effort to maintain the essence of the original resolution, while simultaneously accommodating some of the concerns expressed by the minority and by the administration. For the benefit of our colleagues on the com-

mittee, let me just briefly, if I might, point out what significant changes there are in this substitute.

SUBSTITUTE ACKNOWLEDGES SOVIET VIOLATIONS

There are a number of relatively minor ones, on which I won't take the time of the committee. The first key change is in section 5. The administration and some of our friends on the other side had expressed the concern that the original resolution made no mention of the fact that under SALT II, the Soviets had modernized a considerable portion of their ICBM force. The members will see that the first clause of finding No. 5 makes it clear that the Soviets have done that.

The second clause of finding No. 5 represents a somewhat clearer expression of what the SALT agreements have required the Soviet Union to do. It doesn't mix up warheads and launchers the way some felt the original language of the resolution had and that presumably made it more acceptable to our friend on the other side of the aisle.

The most important change is in finding No. 6. It was pointed out earlier on in the debate that the administration had made serious allegations that the Soviet Union had violated a number of the provisions of the SALT agreements, particularly those dealing with the restriction on only one new type of ICBM, and on the encryption of telemetry. We felt that that was a very legitimate point, and one that needed to be made, and that it would be inappropriate to come to the floor with a resolution on the SALT agreement which made no reference to this at all. We incorporate those concerns and include them in finding No. 6.

I think it is also important to point out the relationship between finding No. 7 and finding No. 6. Some of those who have criticized the resolution have said that it is counterproductive because in the resolving clause it just focuses on the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreement and ignores all of the other provisions in the SALT agreements.

In essence, what this substitute and the original resolution are trying to do is to fence off the agreement we have with the Soviets on the sublimits which, so far, even the administration acknowledges the Soviets have respected, and which we have respected as well. We are saying, in effect, that we should continue to respect the sublimits contained in SALT II so long as the Soviet Union does, even if there may be Soviet violations of other provisions of SALT.

OPTIONS IN RESPONSE TO SOVIET VIOLATIONS

Now, with respect to those other Soviet violations, which the administration alleges exist, finding No. 7 makes it clear that we believe those violations can and should be dealt with, in any one of three ways:

They can be dealt with through the Standing Consultative Commission. If we believe there is a violation, we can try to resolve it with the Soviets in that forum. The previous administration seems to have been able to do that. There have been a number of problems with previous agreements that were resolved in the SCC, but

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so far, this administration doesn't seem to have been able to have achieved such resolutions.

If the SCC doesn't work, and we still have a problem, finding No. 7 indicates that it can be dealt with in the context of the ongoing negotiations at Geneva. And if that doesn't work, finding No. 7 provides that it can be dealt with by other means.

It mentions, for example, that if we are convinced the Soviets have violated the prohibition on only one type of ICBM, by building two new types of ICBM, not only the SS-24 but also SS-25, we could respond in kind by announcements that we plan to proceed with our plans to develop and deploy the Midgetman, which would constitute our second new type of ICBM.

If they are encrypting telemetry and we can't solve that problem, and if we can't resolve it in the SCC, or through the Geneva negotiations, we could respond to that by encrypting our telemetry.

The response which Mr. Mobbs makes to all of this is that not only are there other parts of the SALT agreements besides the numerical subceilings, but that the numerical subceilings have no value in and of themselves. I must say to Mr. Mobbs that I profoundly disagree with that judgment.

SIGNIFICANCE OF NUMERICAL SUBCEILINGS

Numerical subceilings are significant. They do establish constraints. They set up markers beyond which the Soviets cannot go. And if there were no subceilings, or if the Soviets were to violate them, and the treaty then became totally a nullity, they could double the number of their warheads from 15,000 to 30,000. They could convert all of their single warhead missiles to multiwarhead missiles. They could convert the SS-18 with 10 warheads per missile, to 14 warheads per missile. They could exceed the current 820 limit of MIRV'd ICBM's. I do not know whether they will do it if the SALT treaty is abolished, in effect, in its entirety. But they can do it and these subceilings so long as they are respected prevent them from doing it.

SUBSTITUTE RECOGNIZES CONCERNS OF MINORITY

So, what this substitute does, in conclusion, Mr. Chairman, is to incorporate into the text, in the section on the findings, most of the concerns expressed by our friends on the other side of the aisle. I think it is a reasonable and good-faith effort on our part to address the objections which they raised during the course of this debate. At the end of the day, it leaves the resolved clause intact, because we believe that if there are violations of the other provisions of the SALT agreement that have nothing to do with numerical subceilings, they ought to be dealt with, and that there are other ways of dealing with them. So long as we can keep an agreement on the numerical subceilings that is an agreement worth keeping.

Consequently, Mr. Chairman, I strongly urge support for this substitute which I think is fundamentally consistent with the original text, but which represents something of an improvement on it.

WEISS AMENDMENT TO SOLARZ SUBSTITUTE

Mr. WEISS. I want to compliment the gentleman for his generally constructive rewording of the resolution. I have only two questions:

One, I think, is probably style. Paragraph No. 8, instead of "decision to possibly discontinue," there is a general watering down as to the expression of concern by European allies. I put that aside. It seems to me if you phrased it as "tentative decision to discontinue," that that would be still more appropriate than the decision to possibly discontinue.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think the gentleman's suggestion is well taken, Mr. Chairman. I would have certainly no objection.

Chairman FASCELL. Let's see if I understand. You want to change the word "possibly" in paragraph 8 of the substitute to what?

Mr. WEISS. Put in the word "tentative" before the word "decision." The "tentative decision to discontinue."

Mr. SOLARZ. You are eliminating the word "possibly" and adding the word "tentative"?

Mr. WEISS. Right.

Chairman FASCELL. Is there any objection?

If not, the Weiss amendment is agreed to.

QUESTION OF ADMINISTRATION INTENT

Mr. WEISS. The second area I note that in paragraph 6——

Mr. LEACH. Mr. Chairman, there is no tentative decision to discontinue, there is a possible decision to discontinue and the former language is correct. We in the Congress are left up in the air not knowing what the administration intends to do. These gentlemen have testified that we may adhere to SALT, we may not, depending upon what the Soviets do. They have not indicated that the administration has tentatively decided to throw out SALT II.

Mr. WEISS. They said it depends now on what the Soviets do. That is a tentative decision.

Mr. LEACH. It is a tentative decision to possibly discontinue.

Mr. WEISS. No, no, tentative decision to discontinue.

Mr. LEACH. I don't read it precisely that way.

Mr. SOLARZ. I would be happy to yield.

Mr. WEISS. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I am told that this morning Mr. Speakes, on behalf of the White House, in an effort to deal with the confusion that might have occurred by the comment last night that for this administration stated that the SALT Treaty limits no longer exist. I think the word tentative is perhaps understated but certainly more accurate than the theoretical possibility which always exists that some decisions might be——

Mr. LEACH. We have different people saying different things in the administration. In terms of action, they have agreed to dismantle two submarines to maintain the SALT limits. It appears to me that we don't know what the administration intent is. I am not sure the administration knows their intent is. I think the word possibility is perhaps more accurate. Perhaps the administration witnesses can tell us, has there been a tentative decision to discontinue or is there a decision to possibly continue? I don't know, and that might be very helpful to place in the record.

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Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hawes.

Mr. HAWES. My understanding is that the decision is that we will make future decisions not primarily on the basis of the past treaty, but on the basis of Soviet behavior, Soviet behavior in Geneva negotiations, with regard to their compliance with arms control, and with regard to their total force buildup. Those decisions are open.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think the conclusion I draw from this is that in the absence of any change in Soviet policy of behavior, we will discontinue. In that sense, I think the suggestion of the gentleman from New York is accurate.

DISPUTE RESOLUTION

Mr. WEISS. The second area, Mr. Chairman, paragraph 6, is indeed a new paragraph and I think that it logically precedes paragraph 7, which talks about dispute resolution. The problem with it is that as paragraph 6 currently reads, it does not in fact set forth the dispute. It sets forth the context of the administration. I would suggest, at the end, taking away the semicolon, and putting in a comma, and adding "while the Soviet Union disputes those contentions" and then the next is disputes, et cetera, et cetera.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would you yield?

Mr. WEISS. It is your time.

Mr. SOLARZ. This suggestion I am a little bit less comfortable with.

Mr. WEISS. They do dispute it.

Mr. SOLARZ. They obviously do dispute it, but frankly, I think most of us who have looked at the evidence, feel that the conclusions of the administration are much closer to the truth than the Soviet denials, and I would be——

Mr. WEISS. Then why talk about dispute?

Mr. SOLARZ. Because there is a dispute. But if you simply say that "we contend," and that they have another view, the implication is that both arguments are on an equal plane. I think that would convey an unwanted and unintended implication on our part that we accord equal weight to both sides in the dispute.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Hamilton's question was exactly on that point. He suggested that in fact it was a difficult judgment call although in his judgment there is ample reason to believe that in fact our contentions may be right, but in fact, the Russians do dispute the contentions. So I don't see what is wrong—we are saying we do not agree with them, we are saying that there is a dispute.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that is implicit in the langauge of point No. 7 now, which refers to the disputes. There are only two parties to a dispute. Obviously, if they didn't disagree with our contentions that they are violating the agreement, there wouldn't be a dispute. So I think it is implicit and hopefully report language could take care of the problem.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman yield.

Chairman. FASCELL. Go ahead.

NOTING SOVIET VIOLATION OF LIMITS ON STRATEGIC NUCLEAR DELIVERY VEHICLES

Mr. BEREUTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think the gentleman from New York has improved the resolution as far as section 1 findings are concerned. I think the basic defect of the resolution, of course, continues because of section 2, and its limitation through the words "numerical sublimits," but I will come back to that in a second.

I would ask the gentleman from New York, on your proposed section 6 to section 1, would you be willing to include in there as another type of contended violation the following: the "limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles?"

Mr. SOLARZ. What is the language?

Mr. BEREUTER. Where would you put it, put it after ICBM.

Mr. SOLARZ. Comma, presumably?

Mr. BEREUTER. Limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.

Mr. SOLARZ. I believe that is consistent with what we have heard today and with the intent of this paragraph, so I would have no problem with that.

Mr. WEISS. I think what you have to do in order to make it fit is have words like "exceeding the limit on delivery vehicles" so that it fits with deploying more than one new type of ICBM, exceeding on the delivery.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am going back to the verb "violated," "has violated" and I am saying has violated not only the first but has violated the limits on strategic nuclear delivery system, so I don't think it is——

Mr. SOLARZ. I think the gentleman's point is gramatically well taken, it should read "exceeding limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles."

BEREUTER AMENDMENT CONCERNING VIOLATIONS OF OVERALL LIMITS

Mr. BEREUTER. Then I would ask the gentleman why there may be an objection——

Chairman FASCELL. I am trying to get an understanding of your suggestion with respect to language that you have just proposed.

Mr. SOLARZ. I am sorry, please proceed.

Mr. BEREUTER. On section 2, does the gentleman object to the addition of the word?

Mr. SOLARZ. Which finding are you on?

Mr. BEREUTER. Section 2; resolving clause after the word "numerical" to insert the words "limits" or those two words.

Mr. SOLARZ. Yes, I have to say to my very good friend, who spoke to me a little bit earlier, I would object because I think that would render this resolution meaningless and useless. It is the administration's testimony that the Soviets have already violated the overall limits, even though they haven't violated sublimits. Therefore, if we took out the phrase "sublimits" the President would say we no longer have to adhere to any limits because they no longer adhere to the overall limits, and I don't think that's what we are trying to say. Yes, there are problems with this agreement and as you indicated in the language that we accepted for finding No. 6, one of those problems is with their compliance with overall limits, but they have complied with the sublimits. That we want to maintain as long as we can.

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Mr. BEREUTER. Reclaiming my time, I thank the gentleman for his comments, which he made to me a few minutes ago in our conversation. I thought it was important to have those in the record, but I would suggest to the gentleman and to everyone in listening range, that of course, since the sublimits have not been violated to our knowledge, there in fact is still room for additional heads to be added, additional weaponry, within those sublimits, even though the limit has been violated, and so by refusing to add the word "limit," which would cover the delivery vehicles, in addition to the sublimits, we are permitting them to deploy more weapons under sublimits.

Mr. SOLARZ. Would you yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. You not only stop them where they are, stop the United States where it is at those same sublimit levels, but you also put a lid on the overall limit.

Mr. SOLARZ. Will you yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes sir.

Mr. SOLARZ. I think that in the event of any Soviet violation of the overall limits, as with the alleged Soviet violations of the prohibition of deploying more than one new type of ICBM and encrypting telemetry, this resolution clearly implies that if we cannot resolve that difference with them through the SCC or the Geneva negotiations, we can do so by other means. This would enable us to respond in kind to their violations, without upsetting the existing agreements on the sublimits. So there is no implication in here that we are tying our hands with respect to Soviet violations of other provisions of SALT that are unrelated to the sublimits. If they violate those provisions, we can and ought to respond. But this resolution says we shouldn't do it in ways that violate the agreement on sublimits, which go to the heart of this treaty, and which are very important parts of it.

Mr. BEREUTER. Reclaiming my time, I would like to say to the gentleman before I make an amendment, that I think it is important not only that we have this sublimit word in there, but it is also important to give them an incentive in the next few months, to bring back their levels beneath the overall limit, and not to permit the growth of additional weapons, by only holding them to the individual sublimit level.

Now, you may say, as I think you did, that in fact, this means they are in violation, and that gives the President the opportunity to move away from the SALT provisions, which we are now voluntarily complying with, that is true. But there is no intention on the part of the administration to move ahead with additional vehicles or warheads under the limit or outside the limit in the next few months.

And so, what one accomplishes by adding the word limit, in addition to sublimit, is give them an incentive to keep not only sublimits there, but the overall limit to be reduced.

I think that is a valuable consideration. Keep it your way, you provide them an opportunity to have growth in a number of strategic nuclear weapons, that certainly is not in the advantage of the United States or the world.

So, Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment to the Solarz amendment. It is easy to understand. It simply adds the word limit and sublimit.

SOLARZ SUGGESTION TO AMEND LANGUAGE OF SUBSTITUTE

Mr. SOLARZ. If you will yield for a minute?

I have a suggestion. Let me see if this is acceptable to you. If it is, it would induce you to vote for the resolution.

Suppose in section 2, read as follows, you left the existing language exactly the way it is, "the President shall continue to adhere to the numerical sublimits of the SALT agreements, as long as the Soviet Union does likewise"—but take out the period, and add the following—"and the President shall continue to adhere to the overall numerical limits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise."

Mr. BEREUTER. It is certainly an improvement. Give me a second to think about it.

Mr. SOLARZ. We are conceptually distinguishing between the sublimits and overall limits and what that would say is it is as long as they stay within the sublimits, we stay within the sublimits; if they exceed the overall limit, then we are not bound by the overall limit.

Mr. BEREUTER. It certainly permits growth of strategic nuclear weapons on both sides, which I don't think is very desirable. I think we want to have an incentive to bring them down.

Chairman FASCELL. The incentive is for both sides to stay within the limits.

Mr. SOLARZ. That is the whole point.

Mr. BEREUTER. Right now, we are permitting the Soviets to grow under the sublimits with the word, without any kind of prohibition on our side.

Mr. SOLARZ. What I am saying is it is in the language I put to you, if the Soviets exceed the overall limit, then the President would be entitled to exceed the overall limit as well.

Mr. BEREUTER. If I in—had an interest in producing nuclear weapons, I would be for this, I don't have an interest in producing nuclear weapons.

Mr. SOLARZ. By saying to the Soviets, if you do this, then we can respond in kind, you give them an incentive not to do it. That is the whole point. We don't want them to exceed the overall limit. You certainly don't, you have made that point. This is a way of dealing with that problem by putting the Soviets on notice, that if they exceed the overall limit, we may exceed them as well.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would like to ask the gentleman one more point, why isn't my approach better when it gives the incentive to reduce the number of weapons as opposed to permitting them to——

Mr. SOLARZ. Because, as I understand the gentleman's language, it would mean that if the President found that they have exceeded the overall limit, which the administration says they have already concluded, we would no longer be bound by the sublimits.

So, the whole thing would become a nullity. This is a way of dealing with the problem of the overall limits without sacrificing the existing compliance with the limitation on the subceilings

while at the same time giving the Soviets an incentive to come back in to compliance on the overall limits by indicating that if they don't, we wouldn't be bound by them, either.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am inclined to accept the gentleman's amendment. I would like to hear from the gentleman from California, does he care——

AMENDMENT OFFERS INCENTIVE FOR ADHERENCE TO OVERALL LIMITS

Mr. ZSCHAU. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska for yielding. I think the gentleman is making an excellent point, and that is, what is the incentive for the Soviet Union to come back in to compliance with the SALT agreement? That is the objective that we have. The President has indicated that he is not going to feel bound by the SALT agreement unless the Soviets also feel bound, that the incentive for compliance is critical.

I think the gentleman's amendment is a useful amendment, because it provides an incentive to come back within the limitations, the overall limitation, so that the United States would comply not only with those limitations, but the sublimits as well.

The problem I have with the approach of the gentleman from New York, who I think has been very creative in this, these changes to the resolution, is that essentially it has the Soviet Union dictating our strategic nuclear policy.

If they make a violation of the agreement, then the gentleman from New York says we can do the same thing, but just as in trade negotiations, the response may not be reciprocity, the response, the proper response of giving the asymmetry of the situation may be some other change.

So, it seems to me if you don't want the Soviet Union shaping United States nuclear policy, and you want some incentive for them to comply with the SALT agreement, then the amendment of the gentleman from Nebraska should be supported.

Mr. BEREUTER. I do offer the amendment to the amendment, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. WEISS. It seems to me we are again confusing apples and oranges. My understanding is that the overall limits did not come into effect upon the signing of the treaty, that they specifically were to come into effect only on ratification.

The sublimits came into effect upon signing of the treaty. It is confusing the way the gentleman really does ignore the context of the treaty itself.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would say to the gentleman, I believe I have the time, that the gentleman's understanding is correct, but that is not relevant to the purpose of my amendment.

VOTE ON BEREUTER AMENDMENT

Chairman FASCELL. Let me straighten out the parliamentary situation. Are you offering an amendment to the substitute? If so, what is it and where?

Mr. BEREUTER. Yes, sir, I have delivered it to the desk. It simply adds in section 2, after the word numerical, two words. Those words are limited and.

Chairman FASCELL. Does everybody understand the amendment, Mr. Solarz?

Mr. SOLARZ. Very briefly, Mr. Chairman, let me say this amendment, if adopted, makes the whole resolution meaningless and a nullity, because the minute it is adopted, the President will say, the Soviets have violated the limits on the overall ceilings; therefore, we are not obligated to comply with the limits on the subceilings, which is what the resolution is designed to do.

Chairman FASCELL. The question is on the adoption of the amendment of the gentleman from Nebraska. All those in favor signify by saying "aye."

All those opposed, "no."

The noes have it.

Mr. BEREUTER. I would like to have a record vote.

Chairman FASCELL. All those in favor of the amendment of the gentleman from Nebraska, raise your hand—

Mr. BEREUTER. I wanted a record vote.

Chairman FASCELL. The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. BRADY. Chairman Fascell?

Chairman FASCELL. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Hamilton?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Yatron?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Solarz?

Mr. SOLARZ. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bonker?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Studds?

Mr. STUDDS. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Mica?

Mr. MICA. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Barnes?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Wolpe?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Crockett?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Gejdenson?

Mr. GEJDENSON. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Dymally?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Lantos?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Kostmayer?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Torricelli?

Mr. TORRICELLI. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Smith?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Berman?

Mr. BERMAN. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Reid?

Mr. REID. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Levine?
Mr. LEVINE. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Feighan?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Weiss?
Mr. WEISS. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Ackerman?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. MacKay?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Udall?
Mr. UDALL. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Garcia?
Mr. GARCIA. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Broomfield?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Gilman?
Mr. GILMAN. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Lagomarsino?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Leach?
Mr. LEACH. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Roth?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Ms. Snowe?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Solomon?
Mr. SOLOMON. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bereuter?
Mr. BEREUTER. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Siljander?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Zschau?
Mr. ZSCHAU. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Dornan?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Smith?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Mack?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. DeWine?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Burton?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. McCain
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. On this vote, there are 5 ayes and 14 nays.
Chairman FASCELL. The amendment is not agreed to.
Mr. Broomfield?
Mr. BEREUTER. Mr. Chairman, I would ask unanimous consent that I have an opportunity to briefly be recognized on the Solarz amendment for a second time.

BEST COPY AVAILABLE

BROOMFIELD AMENDMENT TO SOLARZ SUBSTITUTE

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Broomfield will offer his amendment now. You can be recognized on that round, if it is all right.

Mr. BEREUTER. All right.

Chairman FASCELL. The chief of staff will report the Broomfield amendment.

Mr. BRADY [reading]:

In section 2 of the proposed substitute, strike out the period at the end of the section, and in lieu thereof insert: Provided, that the Soviet violations of substantive and qualitative provisions of the SALT agreements do not undermine the national security interests of the United States.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Broomfield?

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Before I explain the purpose of the amendment that I am offering, I want to pay a tribute to Mr. Mobbs and Mr. Hawes for their excellent presentation today.

I think it was just super, and I think you have really provided a focus for this entire issue.

Now, the amendment I am offering at this time actually gets away from the numerical numbers, and we address the Soviet violation of the SALT agreement beyond those numerical numbers.

My amendment would also permit the United States to remain within SALT sublimits, so long as the Soviet violations would not undermine our national security.

I think that the President last night was very plain in indicating that he is trying to keep a flexible position, to keep the door open if the Soviets change their behavior and start negotiating in good faith.

So it is obvious to me the President has not rejected the new Soviet proposal completely out of hand. I think this whole matter, this whole subject that we are discussing today is in the wrong approach.

It isn't the United States we have to worry about, it is the Soviet Union. I sometimes wonder whose side we are on. I mean, it is the Soviet Union that is violating it. The President of the United States says we are going to comply. He is the President of the United States.

Why don't we trust him. I don't understand it. Frankly, I think the amendment we are offering here puts it in more even pieces; in other words, if the Soviets continue to violate it, the President has the perfect right to go ahead and say, we are not going to follow the SALT II.

It is up to the Soviet Union. If they want to negotiate in good faith, we are ready to do it. The President made it very plain last night, the new proposal the Soviets offered, would be seriously looked at.

How much do you want? I contend that if this wasn't election time, this matter wouldn't be before Congress. You look at numbers here, you have got the numbers, you are going to win. I know what is going to happen to my amendment.

APPEAL TO INCLUDE LANGUAGE ON VIOLATIONS OF OVERALL LIMITS

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman for yielding. The reason I ask for a record vote on the last issue is to make it clear who was encouraging the growth of nuclear weapons by voting no on my amendment.

And gentlemen, that is what you have just done, and I think you ought to have an opportunity to get out of that trap and so, I would ask the gentleman from New York, if at least to limit this some way, the growth you have provided for, in the numbers of strategic nuclear weapons, that if he will advance his compromise that he offered a few minutes ago.

Chairman FASCELL. Do you care to respond?

Mr. SOLARZ. I made an offer in good faith some time ago, I thought my good friend from Nebraska would accept it in the spirit in which it is was offered. He appears to have been dissuaded from that other amendment, which is a sensible course of action by my friend from California.

I can only say now that it is clear that there is little sentiment for the gentleman's original amendment. I will take under advisement his suggestion, and let me speak with my colleagues.

The gentleman is always free to offer the amendment, but let me talk to some other colleagues. I want to hear what the chairman has to say.

Chairman FASCELL. As far as I am concerned, the action that has been taken constitutes a national policy statement by this Congress. We are trying to bring some restraint to an accelerated arms race.

Mr. SOLARZ. If the gentleman will yield?

Mr. BEREUTER. I am not interested in debating points here.

Chairman FASCELL. I am not, either. You are the one that struck your own amendment.

Mr. BEREUTER. I am talking now about the alternative offered a few minutes ago, which I did not accept at that time by the gentleman from New York, because I believe he imposes no limitations on the growth of nuclear weapons upon both sides of the world, and I am asking of the gentleman if, after he consults, he would be prepared to advance it again, and I give the gentleman a chance to respond, otherwise I will return my time to Mr. Broomfield.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Berman wants to be recognized.

ADHERENCE TO SUBLIMITS IS IN U.S. NATIONAL INTEREST

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is a certain obscurity of logic here that I think has to be more clearly spelled out. The issue is whether or not adherence by both sides to the sublimits that are contained in the SALT II Treaty is in America's national interest.

If it is, then the question of whether violations of other provisions are undermining our national security is beside the point. It cannot possibly follow that breaking out of numerical sublimits by the Soviet Union and United States would add to our security.

If the Soviets have violated substantive and qualitative provisions of the SALT agreements, undermined our national security interests, we should take appropriate responses which serve our na-

tional security interests, not add to the undermining by breaking out of numerical sublimits.

There is nothing in the resolution that is before us now, or in the Solarz substitute, that requires compliance with provisions which would undermine our national interest in the context, and it just seems to me, that we are deflecting the debate from the one question that is important to all this: does adherence to the numerical sublimits serve our national interests. If it does, we must vote against this amendment and support the Solarz amendment.

RATIFICATION WOULD RESOLVE LIMIT/SUBLIMIT CONTROVERSY

Mr. LEACH. I think we are losing sight of one important aspect of the SALT debate. The gentleman from Nebraska has a very fair point, as does Mr. Berman. The fact of the matter is the distinction between limits and sublimits would not be at issue if one situation were reversed.

And that is if the administration would simply submit SALT II for ratification. The issue isn't only the growth of nuclear weapons, because of congressional desire to hold down the sublimits, the issue is also to restrain by making SALT II part of international law as a treaty which the United States has ratified. With ratification comes a cutback by statute, at least by treaty, of the limits as well as the sublimits, and I think that is a perspective that all of us should bear in mind. It's because of the frustration of lack of ratification of SALT II, as well as some of the frustrations about interpretation, that this Congress is in the position it is in.

I would only lend that a further perspective to this hearing.

Chairman FASCELL. Any further discussion on the Broomfield amendment?

RESOLUTION TIES HANDS OF THE PRESIDENT

Mr. SOLOMON. Mr. Chairman, I have sat here and have been unusually quiet, but a few minutes ago, I heard out of the audience some snickering, almost to the point of belittling the President of the United States.

I would like to say I am not chairman of this committee, but if it happens again, I will personally come out there and clear the audience out for what it is worth.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I am a member of the committee, and you can't clear me out, and you can't clear these people out.

Chairman FASCELL. Gentlemen, there will be order. The Chair will decide what happens with respect to the audience. If my colleagues will be kind enough to limit discussion to the Broomfield amendment, it would help.

Mr. SOLOMON. Let's discuss the Broomfield amendment in context, then. You know, if I were on that side of the aisle, what I would do with the Broomfield amendment is offer a substitute. On the third line, I would strike out where it says "that the," and put in these words, "even if the Soviet violations of substantive and qualitative provision on SALT agreement, do" and cross out the word "not," and then continue: "do undermine the national security interests of the United States."

That is actually what you are doing when you vote against the Broomfield amendment. As I read the Post, the Post article, in today's paper, it says the President was deliberately keeping his options open. I think the President was obviously trying to avoid being pinned down about exceeding the SALT II limits.

He said, he was saying the doors are open if there is a change in Soviet behavior. It goes on—I just can't for the life of me, Mr. Chairman, understand when the President is saying if you comply, we will comply.

But what you people are saying is, if the Soviets don't comply, then we have to go ahead and comply anyway. That doesn't make any sense, you are tying the hands of the President, and you should not be doing it.

Mr. Kostmayer, there was nothing personal when I was talking about the audience. You have the right to stand up and say what you want to say.

But I do resent it when members of the audience stand up and belittle the President of the United States of America, and I would like to continue the conversation with you after.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I would be delighted to continue it right now. If the gentleman from New York would yield to me?

Mr. SOLOMON. Yes, sir.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I was talking with the gentleman from California. I wonder if my friend from New York would repeat what he just said, I am sorry? What did you say about the President being belittled?

Mr. SOLOMON. I said when such statements were made that people in the audience were snickering and belittling the President of the United States of America.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. That is their right, Mr. Solomon.

Mr. SOLOMON. No, not before a committee, they don't have a right to applaud, don't have a right to say a word in a meeting of this kind; is that right or wrong?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I think they have to show courtesy.

Mr. SOLOMON. Thank you very much.

Mr. KOSTMAYER. I don't think we ought to threaten to clear the room if an American citizen snickers at the President.

Chairman FASCELL. The Chair will make that decision.

Any further discussion on the Broomfield amendment?

NEED TO ADDRESS SOVIET VIOLATIONS WHILE PRESERVING EXISTING RESTRAINTS

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I want to ask Mr. Berman a question, because you did talk about the importance of numerical limits. I wonder why you don't want to consider the importance of other qualitative violations?

Mr. BERMAN. Yes, you did understand me. I don't think just the numerical sublimits are the important thing. I think adherence by both sides, and obviously and most particularly the Soviet Union, to the numerical sublimits is very much in our national interest, for all the reasons that many commentators have stated often since this whole issue came up a month ago or so.

There are other assertions of violations which may very well undermine our national security interests, and we definitely should do what we can to stop them.

But does the gentleman from Michigan suggest that we should pass a resolution giving the President authority to resume atmospheric nuclear testing because there is an encryption violation, or a Krasnoyarsk violation? No, he wouldn't.

Because adherence to the limited nuclear test ban is in our national interest. It is a question of whether the response is appropriate and how it serves our national interest.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. My concern comes down on what kind of a signal does that send? The most important thing Congress could do if they want to get involved in this area would be to encourage both sides to sit down and negotiate in good faith.

It is going to be settled in Geneva, or between the two leaders of the respective countries, it is not here in Congress. All I was trying to do is to keep the pressure on in the area where it would do the most good, and that would be in Geneva.

I believe the President is very sincere about keeping the door open. He wants to see if the Soviets are willing to meet us halfway on this.

SKEPTICISM WITHIN ADMINISTRATION ON ARMS CONTROL

Mr. BERMAN. Would the gentleman yield just one more time? I very much appreciate what the gentleman is saying. The problem is that a certain level of skepticism has been developed on what the goal is.

There is a struggle within the administration. There was a struggle on this very issue within the administration, and it seems that the folks who may have prevailed are very skeptical about doing anything at Geneva or anything in the area of arms control. It is that skepticism and the decision to undermine the SALT II sublimits, that give us the grave concern that their interest is in reigniting or continuing or expanding the arms race in the belief that that is how we will get the national security we all seek.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I was called, when the White House made the decision to back off on the two Poseidon submarines, to take them out of service, and my reaction was extremely favorable, because again, demonstrated what we are talking about there today is compliance.

Of course, you can take your own position, obviously, you don't agree with me, but that is just exactly what President Reagan is doing, complying with SALT II, and we are trying to continue to give him the maximum flexibility.

The administration didn't ask me to sponsor this kind of amendment. I was trying to work out in good faith with the chairman and Mr. Solarz to see if we couldn't raise this above a pretty political document, but I respect that.

I know how the thing works here. I hope we do continue to comply and keep the pressure on.

Mr. WEISS. Mr. Chairman.

IMPACT OF SOVIET VIOLATIONS ON U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY

Chairman FASCELL. Excuse me, he has yielded to Mr. Zschau.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. I just have 30 seconds left, and I yield that time to the Senator from California.

Mr. ZSCHAU. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

I want to point out that there is some good logic in what the gentleman from Michigan is suggesting here, and let me just put in context the situation we are looking at. The President has indicated that unless Soviet behavior changes, that we will deploy the 131st B-52 air-launched cruise missile, and that would violate what we are referring to in this resolution.

But also, we have acknowledged that the Soviet Union has violated the new—violated the agreement by deploying a second new missile: The SS-25, which, I think there are some 72, and so, we are talking about the contrast between what the President has proposed, one new B-52 versus 72 new ICBM's, and it seems to me that the impact on our national security of what the Soviets have done outside of the numerical limit constraints is very substantial, or could be very substantial.

And what the gentleman from Michigan is indicating, that maybe we are taking too narrow a view by just focusing on numerical sublimits, that we should look at the national security implications of all violations of agreement rather than just that narrow view.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Weiss.

QUESTION ON ADMINISTRATION'S COMMITMENT TO ARMS CONTROL

Mr. WEISS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the fact that the gentleman from Michigan has offered his amendment in all sincerity, and that it is his own suggestion, but I might suggest to him that to couple the offering of that amendment with the suggestion that those of us supporting the resolution are doing so out of political motivation is hardly the way to induce members on this side of the aisle to agree with his amendment.

I should say substantively, that what we are talking about here really is a very, very fundamental issue of nuclear arms control in the nuclear arms race, and there are many of us who indeed have questions about the President's commitment, for genuine reasons on his own part, to continuation of the arms control agreements. When he campaigned in 1980, he opposed SALT II, and then later he thought maybe on balance it was good for the United States.

Now he seems to be shifting, and changing his mind again, and I don't want to put my faith in the future of nuclear arms control agreements on what the President conceives in any particular moment in history to be in the national security interests of the United States of America.

Mr. BEREUTER. Would the gentleman yield?

Mr. WEISS. I would be pleased to.

Mr. BEREUTER. A few minutes ago, my comments ruffled some feathers, and it was suggested that by the failure to vote for my amendment, the implication was that you were necessarily voting for more nuclear weapons.

That would or could happen, but I do not make the inference that the gentleman on the other side and this side of the aisle voted for an increase in nuclear weapons, and I apologize for a lack of clarity in my words, and I don't want it to impact upon what I think is a good-faith effort by the gentleman from Michigan, and I thank the chairman.

VOTE ON THE BROOMFIELD AMENDMENT

Chairman FASCELL. I thank the gentleman from Nebraska.

The question is on the Broomfield Amendment. All those in favor of the amendment—a record vote is requested.

The clerk will call the roll.

Mr. BRADY. Chairman Fascell?

Chairman FASCELL. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Hamilton?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Yatron?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Solarz?

Mr. SOLARZ. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bonker?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Studds?

Mr. STUDDS. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Mica?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Barnes?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Wolpe?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Crockett?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Gejdenson?

Mr. GEJDENSON. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Dymally?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Lantos?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Kostmayer?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Torricelli?

Mr. TORRICELLI. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Smith?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Berman?

Mr. BERMAN. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Reid?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Levine?

Mr. LEVINE. No.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Feighan?

[No response.]

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Weiss?

Mr. WEISS. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Ackerman?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. MacKay?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Udall?
Mr. UDALL. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Garcia?
Mr. GARCIA. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Broomfield?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Gilman?
Mr. GILMAN. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Lagomarsino?
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Leach?
Mr. LEACH. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Roth?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Ms. Snowe?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Hyde?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Solomon?
Mr. SOLOMON. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bereuter?
Mr. BEREUTER. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Siljander?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Zschau?
Mr. ZSCHAU. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Dornan?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Smith?
Mr. CHRISTOPHER SMITH. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Mack?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. DeWine?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Burton?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. McCain
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. On this vote, 7 ayes, 12 noes.
Chairman FASCELL. The amendment is not agreed to.

UNANIMOUS CONSENT REQUEST TO AMEND SUBSTITUTE

Mr. SOLARZ. I ask unanimous consent to amend section 2 of the resolution, line 17 of the substitute, by changing the period to a comma, and then adding in the words, "and the President shall continue to adhere to the overall numerical limits of the SALT agreements as long as the Soviet Union does likewise."
I yield.

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Bereuter.

Mr. BEREUTER. I thank the gentleman from New York for reoffering his proposal. I think it is an important contribution. I think it is likely to reduce the likelihood of additional warheads and delivery vehicles, and I thank him for offering.

VOTE ON THE SOLARZ SUBSTITUTE

Chairman FASCELL. Further discussion?

If not, the question is on the adoption of the amendment, all those in favor signify by saying aye?

All those opposed, no.

And the amendment is agreed to.

Are there further amendments? If not, the question is on the Solarz substitute as revised by the unanimous consent agreements of Mr. Weiss and Mr. Bereuter, and as amended.

The chief of staff will call the roll.

Mr. BRADY. Chairman Fascell?

Chairman FASCELL. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Hamilton?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Hamilton votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Yatron?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Yatron votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Solarz?

Mr. SOLARZ. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bonker?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Bonker votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Studds?

Mr. STUDDS. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Mica?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Mica votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Barnes?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Barnes votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Wolpe?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Wolpe votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Crockett?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Crockett votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Gejdenson?

Mr. GEJDENSON. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Dymally?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Dymally votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Lantos?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Lantos votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Kostmayer?

Mr. KOSTMAYER. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Torricelli?

Mr. TORRICELLI. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Smith?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Smith votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Berman?

Mr. BERMAN. Aye.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Reid?

Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Reid votes aye by proxy.

Mr. BRADY. Mr. Levine?
Mr. LEVINE. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Feighan?
Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Feighan votes aye by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Weiss?
Mr. WEISS. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Ackerman?
Chairman FASCELL. Mr. Ackerman votes aye by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. MacKay?
Chairman FASCELL. Mr. MacKay votes aye by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Udall?
Mr. UDALL. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Garcia?
Mr. GARCIA. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Broomfield?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Gilman?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No, by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Lagomarsino?
Mr. LAGOMARSINO. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Leach?
Mr. LEACH. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Roth?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Ms. Snowe?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. Aye, by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Hyde?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. I don't have a proxy for him.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Solomon?
Mr. SOLOMON. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Bereuter?
Mr. BEREUTER. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Siljander?
[No response.]
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Zschau?
Mr. ZSCHAU. No.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Dornan?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No, by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Smith?
Mr. CHRISTOPHER SMITH. Aye.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Mack?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No, by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. DeWine?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No, by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Burton?
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No, by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. McCain
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No, by proxy.
Mr. BRADY. Mr. Siljander.
Mr. BROOMFIELD. No, by proxy.
Chairman FASCELL. The chief of staff will report the vote.
Mr. BRADY. On this vote, 29 ayes and 11 nays.

VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION AS AMENDED BY THE SUBSTITUTE

Chairman FASCELL. The substitute is agreed to.

The question now recurs on House Concurrent Resolution 350 as amended by the substitute. All those in favor signify by saying "aye."

All those opposed, "no."

The ayes have it, and the resolution is agreed to.

The time for filing minority reports, 5:00 Monday night.

Mr. BROOMFIELD. Fine.

Chairman FASCELL. All right, I want to thank Mr. Hawes and Mr. Mobbs for being with us, and being responsive to our questions.

Mr. MOBBS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman FASCELL. The committee stands adjourned subject to the call of the Chair.

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

APPENDIX 1

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT, MAY 27, 1986

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release May 27, 1986

PRESIDENTIAL STATEMENT ON INTERIM RESTRAINT

On the eve of the Strategic Arms Reductions Talks (START) in 1982, I decided that the United States would not undercut the expired SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement or the unratified SALT II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. I took this action, despite my concerns about the flaws inherent in those agreements, to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions. I made clear that our policy required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet military buildup.

Last June, I reviewed the status of U.S. interim restraint policy. I found that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain. As I have documented in three detailed reports to the Congress, most recently in December 1985, the Soviet Union, regrettably, has not. I noted last June that the pattern of Soviet non-compliance with their existing arms control commitments increasingly affected our national security. This pattern also raised fundamental concerns about the integrity of the arms control process itself. A country simply cannot be serious about effective arms control unless it is equally serious about compliance.

In spite of the regrettable Soviet record, I concluded last June that it remained in the interest of the United States and its allies to try, once more, to establish an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic offensive arms as we pursued, with renewed vigor, our objective of deep reductions in existing U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals through the Geneva negotiations. Therefore, I undertook to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, USS SAM RAYBURN, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. However, I made it clear that, as subsequent U.S. deployment milestones were reached, I would assess the overall situation and determine future U.S. actions on a case-by-case basis in light of Soviet behavior in exercising restraint comparable to our own, correcting their non-compliance, reversing their unwarranted military build-up, and seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reduction agreements.

Later this month, the 8th TRIDENT submarine, USS NEVADA, begins sea trials. In accordance with our announced policy, I have assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have considered Soviet actions since my June 1985 decision, and U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both those actions and our programmatic options. The situation is not encouraging.

While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting U.S. concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet non-compliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet non-compliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden second new Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) type, continues apace. The Soviet Union continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic missile testing in a manner which impedes verification. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains a clear violation. We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force build-up. Finally, since the November summit, we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev and myself to achieve early progress in the Geneva

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negotiations, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim agreement on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF).

Based on Soviet conduct since my June 1985 decision, I can only conclude that the Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would indicate its readiness to join us in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. At the same time, I have also considered the programmatic options available to the U.S. in terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.

When I issued guidance on U.S. policy on June 10, 1985, the military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take more time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

The United States had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the oldest POSEIDON submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. Had I been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two POSEIDON submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to the national security, I would have directed that these two POSEIDON submarines not be dismantled, but be overhauled and retained. However, in view of present circumstances, including current military and economic realities, I have directed their retirement and dismantlement as planned.

As part of the same decision last June, I also announced that we would take appropriate and proportionate responses when needed to protect our own security in the face of continuing Soviet non-compliance. It is my view that certain steps are now required by continued Soviet disregard of their obligations.

Needless to say, the most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of our full strategic modernization program, to underwrite deterrence today, and the continued pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research program, to see if it is possible to provide a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies. The strategic modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles, is the foundation for all future U.S. offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance. It would immediately and seriously undercut our negotiators in Geneva by removing the leverage that they must have to negotiate equitable reductions in both U.S. and Soviet forces. It would send precisely the wrong signal to the leadership of the Soviet Union about the seriousness of our resolve concerning their noncompliance. And, it would significantly increase the risk to our security for years to come. Therefore, our highest priority must remain the full implementation of these programs.

Secondly, the development by the Soviet Union of its massive ICBM forces continues to challenge seriously the essential balance which has deterred both conflict and coercion. Last June, I cited the Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under

SALT II, as a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBMs growing, I now call upon the Congress to restore bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in the future, including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, I have directed the Department of Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles and specific alternative configurations for the Small ICBM in terms of size, number of warheads, and production rates.

Finally, I have also directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

This brings us to the question of the SALT agreements. SALT II was a fundamentally flawed and unratified treaty. Even if ratified, it would have expired on December 31, 1985. When presented to the U.S. Senate in 1979, it was considered by a broad range of critics, including the Senate Armed Services Committee, to be unequal and unverifiable in important provisions. It was, therefore, judged by many to be inimical to genuine arms control, to the security interests of the United States and its allies, and to global stability. The proposed treaty was clearly headed for defeat before my predecessor asked the Senate not to act on it.

The most basic problem with SALT II was that it codified major arms buildups rather than reductions. For example, even though at the time the Treaty was signed in 1979, the U.S. had, and only planned for, 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers, and the Soviet Union possessed only about 600, SALT II permitted each side to increase the number of such launchers to 820. It also permitted a build-up to 1,200 MIRVed ballistic launchers (both ICBMs and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles, SLBMs) even though the U.S. had only about 1,050 and the Soviet Union had only about 750 when the treaty was signed. It permitted the Soviet Union to retain all of its heavy ballistic missiles. Finally, it limited ballistic missile launchers, not the missiles or the warheads carried by the ballistic missiles. Since the signing of SALT II, Soviet ballistic missile forces have grown to within a few launchers of each of the 820 and 1,200 MIRVed limits, and from about 7,000 to over 9,000 warheads today. What is worse, given the failure of SALT II to constrain ballistic missile warheads, the number of warheads on Soviet ballistic missiles will continue to grow very significantly, even under the Treaty's limits, in the continued absence of Soviet restraint.

In 1982, on the eve of the START negotiations, I undertook not to undercut existing arms control agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union demonstrated comparable restraint. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union did not exercise comparable restraint, and uncorrected Soviet violations have seriously undermined the SALT structure. Last June, I once again laid out our legitimate concerns but decided to go the extra mile, dismantling a POSEIDON submarine, not to comply with or abide by a flawed and unratified treaty, but rather to give the Soviet Union one more chance and adequate time to take the steps necessary to join us in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The Soviet Union has not used the past year for this purpose.

Given this situation, I have determined that, in the future, the United States must base decisions regarding its strategic force structure on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure which has been undermined by Soviet non-compliance, and especially in a flawed

SALT II treaty which was never ratified, would have expired if it had been ratified, and has been violated by the Soviet Union.

Since the United States will retire and dismantle two POSEIDON submarines this summer, we will remain technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the U.S. equips its 131st B-52 heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year. However, given the decision that I have been forced to make, I intend at that time to continue deployment of U.S. B-52 heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft as an appropriate response without dismantling additional U.S. systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, since we will remain in technical compliance with the terms of the expired SALT II Treaty for some months, I continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

The United States seeks to meet its strategic needs, given the Soviet build-up, by means that minimize incentives for continuing Soviet offensive force growth. In the longer term, this is one of the major motives in our pursuit of the Strategic Defense Initiative. As we modernize, we will continue to retire older forces as our national security requirements permit. I do not anticipate any appreciable numerical growth in U.S. strategic offensive forces. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program the United States will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles than does the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the United States will not deploy more strategic ballistic missile warheads than does the Soviet Union.

In sum, we will continue to exercise the utmost restraint, while protecting strategic deterrence, in order to help foster the necessary atmosphere for significant reductions in the strategic arsenals of both sides. This is the urgent task which faces us. I call on the Soviet Union to seize the opportunity to join us now in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint.

Finally, I want to emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has received, and continues to receive, my highest priority. I hope the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement I reached with General Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to achieve early progress, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this agreement, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

APPENDIX 2

Statement of Hon. Gerard C. Smith, Former Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

I.

It has been suspected for some time that officials in this Administration oppose arms control in principle. Their view is that the U.S. security would be improved by engaging in an open arms race and that arms control simply lulls the American public into a false sense of security. Now it seems that this kind of thinking has won out.

The President's recent decision signalling the end of SALT I and II is the latest move in what appears to be an Administration program for decontrol of strategic weapons. Last year a new interpretation of the ABM Treaty was floated which would have permitted the development and testing of space based defenses contrary to the Treaty language. Congress and our allies put up strong objections and the Administration retreated - although the new version was labelled as "fully justified".

This year - unless the unexpected happens - all agreed limits on offensive strategic weapons are to be terminated.

Next year, the Review Conference on the ABM Treaty, of

unlimited duration may well be used by the Administration to terminate that Treaty.

II.

Scrapping SALT will allow the Soviets to increase their most destabilizing and threatening weapons, the MIRVed ICBMs. Right now, the Soviet Union is up against key SALT ceilings on MIRVed ICBMs. Keeping under the SALT ceilings, the Soviets have dismantled, destroyed, withdrawn or converted nearly 1400 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Now these ceilings are swept aside.

III.

In lieu of the SALT agreements with their very detailed provisions, the Administration has proposed an informal "restraint" regime. We will not deploy more strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or missile warheads than the U.S.S.R. does. This seems a rather empty promise since the U.S.S.R. has deployed over 500 more SNDVs and 1800 more missile warheads, and we couldn't surpass their levels during the Reagan Administration. Note that the President did not say that we would not extend our lead in overall strategic warheads and in bombers and

cruise missiles. Since the SALT provisions against concealment from interference with intelligence systems used to verify compliance are to be abandoned, the new arrangement looks to be somewhat less verifiable than SALT II, the verifiability of which was criticized by the Administration.

Apparently, the new informal restraint is premised on a belief that the Soviets do not intend to increase their forces in the post-SALT period. That seems a peculiar calculation, since we have heard continual charges of the Soviet relentless strategic buildup. That no longer appears to be a concern, and one official has gone so far as to say he would like to see the Soviets retain older missiles as they deploy new types as that would be a bad investment. This suggests that the new restraint policy is based on a philosophy of trust the Russians to act in our interest.

The strongest argument for junking SALT is Soviet noncompliance. Generals Chain and Ellis, however, have testified that the Soviets were generally meeting their treaty obligations, and even the specific charges of violations remain open to some question. For example, Secretary Shultz last year said of the SS25 issue, "There are questions about whether in a purely technical sense it fits within treaty language as might be interpreted by a lawyer." I should think a lawyer's interpretation of a treaty would be at least as good as a non-lawyer's. I understand that the treaty language in question was drafted by

lawyers.

The Administration's handling of the compliance issue suggests that its purpose was more to destroy American confidence in the effort to reduce nuclear war risks by cooperation with an adversary than it was to pressure the U.S.S.R. into fuller compliance with agreed restraints. The coincidence is striking that frequent cries of "foul" come from many who didn't want to play the game in the first place.

IV.

The Administration often speaks about the need for the Soviets to correct their arms control behavior. But what would we think if the Soviets:

A) Failed to ratify the three latest arms control treaties that their premier had signed?

B) Walked away from negotiations for a comprehensive test ban and for limits on anti-satellite systems (ASATs)?

C) Announced that they were making an all out effort to develop nationwide defenses banned by treaty?

D) Announced that that treaty's correct interpre-

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tation permitted the development and testing of such systems although by its terms such activities are prohibited?

E) Had refrained from starting negotiations about strategic arms for many months and them made offers which their former Minister of Foreign Affairs acknowledged to be non-negotiable and "absurd"? [1]

F) While claiming violations, had refrained from making effective use of the Standing Consultative Commission to resolve disputes or was reported to have denied permission for its delegate to raise key issues?

G) Announced that it was breaking out of an agreement setting ceilings on missiles and bombers because of the bad behavior of the other party?

With this U.S. record, I think that a degree of caution may be warranted in assessing our estimates of Soviet behavior.

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1 Former Secretary of State Haig states in his book CAVEAT: REALISM, REAGAN, AND FOREIGN POLICY on Page 223 that our proposal at SALT was non-negotiable because it demanded too much in the way of reduction of the Soviet forces, and he called our INF proposal absurd.

V.

It is acknowledged by even the most enthusiastic supporters of strategic defenses that to be effective they must be accompanied by tight restraints on Soviet offensive forces. First casting away existing offensive arms controls seems counterproductive to our SDI expectations. This is a miscalculation about what gives the Soviets incentives to negotiate.

Incidentally, it may be worth recalling that the last time we abandoned an arms control arrangement, the informal test moratorium, President Eisenhower's announcement in 1959 that the U.S. would no longer be bound was followed by an extraordinary burst of Soviet testing. That should be a lesson for those officials who think the Soviets will not react to our claim that their cheating justifies our termination of SALT.

I do not agree with the naysayers of past arms controls who predict that the prospect is now brighter for real arms control negotiations. Breaking an old bargain seems a strange way to make a new one.

But things may not be hopeless. The nuclear test generated radiation pollution of earth's atmosphere was ended by Soviet-American cooperation within a year of the crisis tensions of the Soviet missile deployment in Cuba in 1962.

Chernobyl has given all of us a minute whiff of nuclear warfare. If we and the Soviets are as rational as some believe, it should be possible for a Soviet-American effort to reduce the risk of war-produced radiation of vastly greater proportions.

VI.

We are paying a high price in terms of North Atlantic Alliance Solidarity for this excursion from arms control. The Canadian Foreign Minister calls it "A profoundly disturbing development which we had hoped would not occur." Having worked on NATO issues for 36 years, I do not recall any time when American leadership of the Alliance has been viewed so negatively. The Soviets must place a high value on such a development.

VII.

Some people whose judgement I respect have little concern over the SALT announcement. They are convinced that having fired a warning shot, the President will find an adequate reason to avoid undercutting SALT. I trust that they are right.

Two more fleet ballistic missile submarines are to be

overhauled or retired late this year, I know of no funds requested for their modernization. If they are scrapped, the U.S. would find itself in the interesting position of again being under the SALT levels even though we had denounced SALT, and for a short time exceeded its level by deploying cruise missiles on bombers. We would have denounced the Treaty to no useful end at all.

If the still hoped for Summit meeting results in a joint decision to negotiate seriously at Geneva, that might be enough to warrent a Presidential reversal. On the other hand, the Soviets might torpedo a Summit becaure of the SALT shootdown as they did in 1960 in the wake of the U2 shootdown.

VIII.

In conclusion, I would urge the Congress to take every opportunity to persuade the President to resurrect SALT and adopt a more vigorous and consistent arms control posture. The Executive Branch's denunciation of SALT leaves Congress as the main defender of arms control.

It is not too late to achieve deep reductions in offensive forces, as long as they are not threatened by strategic defenses. Reasonable research programs, not crash programs, on such defenses could continue. If defenses prove feasible

and desirable, the Administration admits they would still have to be accompanied by stringent limits on offensive forces. But if these efforts show that effective defenses would not be feasible, economic or stabilizing, the chance for deep reductions in offensive forces would not have been lost. It both sides want to, we should be able to make progress on reducing the numbers of retaliatory weapons at the same time as we research the prospects for defneses against them, within the constraints of the ABM Treaty.

APPENDIX 3

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL C. WARNKE, FORMER DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, AND FORMER CHIEF OF THE U.S. DELEGATION TO THE SALT II NEGOTIATIONS

SCRAPPING SALT DOOMS
THE REAGAN STRATEGIC PROGRAM

The President's decision to abandon the existing arms control constraints is incompatible with his announced strategic objectives. Despite the efforts of some commentators to rationalize his announcement as simply a bargaining ploy, the decision is a sweeping one that not only cancels the central numerical limits of the SALT II Treaty but also the controls in the 1972 SALT I Agreement on offensive weapons.

It is also apparent that those who persuaded the President to take this action are aiming at the 1972 Antiballistic Missile Treaty as well. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger said on June 2nd that "extending the ABM Treaty or doing anything that would prevent doing all the things we need to do to develop a Strategic Defense Initiative is something obviously we would be very much opposed to." The Secretary seems not to understand that the ABM Treaty is of indefinite duration and that explicit renunciation by the United States will be required if its limits are to be disregarded.

Other Reagan administration officials have discounted the impact of this decision in evoking a major increase in the nuclear threat that we and our allies face. As a practical matter, however, it is obvious that the decision flies in the face of what the Administration has claimed to be its goals of reducing offensive nuclear weapons and pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative. The Administration has repeatedly stressed its desire for deep cuts in the most destabilizing of nuclear weapon systems -- the land-based, multiple warhead, intercontinental ballistic missiles. This is the category of weapons in which the Soviet Union has a sizable lead both in numbers and in size and throw-weight. Warheads on ICBMs constitute about three-fourths of Soviet strategic forces. They account for less than 30% of our own strategic nuclear warheads. Reduction in this category of weaponry has been, accordingly, a commendable feature of President Reagan's declared arms control policy.

With respect to the highly optimistic goals of the Strategic Defense Initiative, any chance of success also depends upon major cuts in Soviet strategic warheads. Those in charge of the SDI office have been candid in expressing their dubiety about being able to deal with the existing Soviet force of some 10,000 ballistic missile warheads. Their plans have been predicated on a reduced Soviet force. The President's decision thus dooms his dream of a defense-oriented world.

But the realistic chance of securing offensive nuclear warhead reductions, together with the more ephemeral possibility that this would facilitate an effective defense, are both dashed by the decision to open the floodgates for major Soviet increases.

One source of such increase is virtually inevitable. The Soviet Union is up against the SALT limits in overall nuclear delivery vehicles and, more importantly, in the sub-ceilings on both multiple warhead land-based missiles and heavy missiles. In order to remain within these limits, the Soviet Union has dismantled and destroyed existing systems as newer strategic systems have been deployed. Since SALT I came into effect, over 1,000 land-based missiles, over 200 submarine-launched missiles, 45 strategic bombers and 21 ballistic missile submarines have been removed from the Soviet inventory. The Soviet Union is now deploying a single warhead, land-mobile ICBM that we call the SS-25. Just about ready for deployment is the 10-warhead SS-24, that we anticipate will be rail-mobile. Experience in dealing with the Soviets makes me more than skeptical that they will go to the trouble and expense of destroying existing Soviet ICBMs to stay within SALT limits that we have told them are no longer applicable. I doubt that Soviet philanthropy will extend that far.

In addition, our insistence that there be no restrictions on strategic defense, with strong indications that we will proceed even if this means repudiation of the ABM Treaty, provides a powerful incentive for the Soviets to proliferate their offensive warheads. As Secretary Weinberger said in his pre-summit letter to the President last November, any likelihood of a Soviet territorial defense will require that, rather than decreasing our offensive forces, we increase them and their ability to penetrate the Soviet defensive system. There is no reason to feel that the Soviet Union will be more indulgent about American defensive measures.

It is also clear that they have readily available the means for major increases in ICBM warheads. Under the SALT II Treaty, their massive SS-18 can have no more than 10 warheads each. The size of the SS-18 is such that each missile could readily accommodate two or three times that number. For example, our MX is configured for 10 warheads and it is comparable to the Soviet SS-19, much smaller than the SS-18. An increase from 6 to 10 warheads on the SS-19 is also predictable if the present mistaken policy of scrapping existing arms control limits is allowed to continue.

The Soviets can find another source of strategic warheads by converting the intermediate-range SS-20 to the intercontinental-range SS-16. Agreement was reached in the SALT negotiations, and recorded in a Common Understanding, that the Soviet Union would not produce, test or deploy the SS-16 or produce the third stage of that missile, which is all that differentiates it from the SS-20. The result would be a mobile missile, with three warheads each, that could strike the United States as well as our NATO and Asian allies.

In support of this departure from the policy of the four preceding Presidents, two Democrats and two Republicans, administration spokesmen contend that Soviet violations have vitiated the worth of existing agreements. As has been noted by Republican and Democratic Senators, such as John Chafee and Sam Nunn, the controversies about violations do not relate to the core provisions of the SALT II Treaty and SALT I Agreement. The announced U.S. intention to go beyond the SALT ceiling of 1,320 when the 131st B-52 is equipped with cruise missiles thus cannot be considered a proportionate response.

The only two current serious SALT compliance issues relate to the SS-25 ICBM and the extent of Sovet encryption of telemetry. The Administration maintains that the SS-25 is a second new type of ICBM whereas SALT II allows each side only one. The Soviets insist that the SS-25 is a permitted modernization of the SS-13. I don't know what the answer is, but I do know that it is a closer question than most Administration spokesmen have been willing to concede. In a televised interview, however, Secretary of State George Shultz conceded that "there are questions about whether in a purely technical sense it [the SS-25] fits within treaty language as might be interpreted by a lawyer." That, of course, is the usual way in which treaties are interpreted.

In any event, from the standpoint of the military impact

it makes no sense to free the Soviet Union to deploy the single warhead mobile missile as an augmentation rather than as a replacement of missiles presently in its ICBM force. Secretary Weinberger has said that the Soviet Union has deployed 72 SS-25's and that each one of the 72 is a violation. What he does not point out is that the Soviets have destroyed 72 SS-11's in order to make room for the SS-25s under SALT.

A year ago, in announcing his decision to continue compliance with SALT, President Reagan noted that an appropriate response to the SS-25 would be continued development and deployment of the Midgetman, a comparable single warhead, mobile ICBM. As noted in the report of his own Commission on Strategic Forces, better known as the Scowcroft Commission, both sides should be encouraged to move toward single warhead ICBMs, as providing for assured retaliatory deterrent without first strike capability.

On the issue of the encoding of test data, described as encryption of telemetry, it should be noted that the treaty does not ban this practice. Both sides are permitted to encrypt telemetry, unless "such denial impedes verification of compliance." Regrettably, this leaves a large subjective element in the determination. On any reasonable interpretation, however, the extent of Soviet encryption seems excessive.

But the answer to our concern certainly should not be to eliminate all controls over Soviet freedom to interfere with our national technical means of verification or to use deliberate concealment measures. These undertakings are found in both the SALT I Interim Agreement and the SALT II Treaty. Under these provisions, both sides have challenged actions that they believed impeded verification. In the past, the challenged actions have been discontinued. Now, however, if the decision to discard all restraints stands, we will have no basis to object to any and all concealment practices that the Soviet Union may elect to adopt. Their closed society means that the abandonment of these limits will enable them more effectively to conceal the size and quality of their nuclear forces than will be possible in our democracy and with our free press.

Finally, it should be noted that 7 years ago, in the hearings on ratification of the SALT II Treaty, the Joint Chiefs testified that they supported the Treaty because its restrictions bore more heavily on Soviet forces than on ours.

This is even more true today . Deployment of more than 130 B-52's with cruise missiles will put us over the SALT limit of 1,320 applicable tc MIRVed ballistic missiles and strategic bombers thus equipped. If additional aging Poseidon submarines are retired on schedule, however, our breaching of SALT limits will be short-lived. Before the end of this year, two additional Poseidon submarines will have to be overhauled or retired. The economic and military considerations that led to the President's current decision to dismantle the Nathan Hale and the Nathaniel Green are equally applicable to these two submarines, and will be to a third by June of 1987. The retirement of forty-eight SLBM launchers (sixteen per submarine) would accommodate both a new Trident submarine and twenty-four more B-52's with cruise missiles.

In contrast, Soviet multiple-warhead missiles, the SS-17, 18 and 19, need not be overhauled or retired. Neither does the SS-11. Since the SS-24 and SS-25 are mobile missiles, the Soviets do not need to use the silos now occupied by the older missiles or to build additional silos. The Soviet Union is much better placed than we are to make these and other significant increases in its nuclear arsenal. This fact is confirmed by studies prepared by CIA and DIA.

The decision to scrap SALT is therefore ideological rather than logical. It should be reconsidered and reversed.

APPENDIX 4

STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH L. ADELMAN, DIRECTOR, U.S. ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

Mr. Chairman:

Early in 1982, as the US embarked upon negotiations with the Soviets to reduce strategic arms, the President made a policy decision not to undercut provisions of the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT II Treaty so long as the Soviet Union exercised equal restraint. The President adopted this policy at that time not out of the conviction that those documents represented sound arms control. On the contrary, he continued to regard those documents as seriously flawed and as an unsound basis for long-term arms control. The President's policy was simply a good faith effort to foster an atmosphere of mutual restraint conducive to serious negotiations on arms reductions and was, from the beginning, explicitly conditioned on a requirement of Soviet reciprocity.

Last June the President carefully reviewed that interim policy. He found that while the US had kept its part of the bargain, the Soviet Union had not. The President has documented Soviet violations of its SALT commitments in three detailed reports prepared in response to Congressional requirements. Nevertheless, the President decided in June 1985 to go the extra mile by dismantling a Poseidon submarine in order to give the Soviet Union adequate time to join the US in establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint. The President made clear at that time, however, that he would assess future US deployment milestones on a case-by-case basis in light of whether

the Soviets were correcting their violations of arms control commitments, whether they were reversing their unwarranted military buildup, and whether they were seriously pursuing equitable and verifiable arms reductions agreements.

In light of the fact that the 8th Trident submarine began sea trials last month and the US would have been required to make compensating dismantlements if we were to stay within the SALT II ceilings, the President again reviewed our interim restraint policy in terms of the criteria that he identified last June.

The first criterion was that the Soviet Union take the positive concrete steps to correct its noncompliance and resolve other compliance concerns. While it would be fair to say that we have seen some modest indications of improvement in one or two areas, there has been no real progress toward meeting US concerns with respect to the general pattern of Soviet noncompliance with major arms control commitments, particularly in those areas of most obvious and direct Soviet noncompliance with the SALT and ABM agreements. The deployment of the SS-25, a prohibited second new type intercontinental ballistic missile, continues. Soviet encryption of telemetry associated with its new strategic ballistic missile testing continues to impede verification of compliance with these agreements. The Krasnoyarsk radar

continues to be a clear violation of the ABM Treaty. We have repeatedly and exhaustively pursued these and other US concerns about Soviet noncompliance through diplomatic channels and in the Standing Consultative Commission for the past three years. We have also addressed the SALT issues in the Nuclear and Space Talks.

With respect to the President's second criterion, that the Soviet Union reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military buildup, we see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force build-up. During the last year, fifth generation SS-25 ICBMs entered service and test firings of the fifth generation multi-warhead SS-X-24 continued as the deployment of the USSR's highly accurate, fourth generation SS-18 Mod 4 program was reaching completion. Preparations are underway for flight tests of three future ICBMs being developed to build on the capabilities of the 4th and 5th generations.

With respect to sea-based systems, the modern Typhoon submarine, with the SS-N-20 missile, continues to be produced and deployed even as a newer class SSBN, the Delta IV, is being deployed with the SS-NX-23. The Soviets will probably begin flight testing of a modernized version of the SS-N-20, and will develop a modernized version of the SS-NX-23 before the end of the decade. These systems may eventually provide the Soviets

with a hard target capability for SLBMs. In addition, a newer class of strategic ballistic missile submarine is likely to enter the force in the early 1990s. In sum, by the mid-1990s, nearly all of the USSR's currently deployed strategic nuclear attack forces--ICBMs, SLBMs, and manned strategic bombers--will have been replaced by more advanced strategic nuclear weapons systems.

Finally, since the summit last November we have yet to see the Soviets follow up constructively on the commitment made by General Secretary Gorbachev to achieve early progress in the Geneva negotiations.

Given the lack of Soviet reciprocity, on May 27 the President announced a significant change in US policy. He has decided that US decisions regarding its strategic force structure will be based on the nature and magnitude of the threat posed by Soviet strategic forces, and not on standards contained in the SALT structure, which has been undermined by Soviet noncompliance. This is especially so with respect to the flawed SALT II agreement, which was never ratified by the US, which would have expired by now if it had been ratified, and which continues to be violated by the Soviet Union. The SALT I Interim Offensive Agreement of 1972, which expired in 1977 and is no longer legally binding, has also been violated by the Soviet Union, despite its commitment to abide by its limitations.

The US had long planned to retire and dismantle two of the older Poseidon submarines when their reactor cores were exhausted. As the President noted, the amount of flexibility that any nation has in the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best. Our military planning will take time to move out from under the shadow of previous assumptions, especially in the budgetary conditions which we now face. These budgetary conditions make it all the more essential that we make the very best possible use of our resources.

Had the President been persuaded that refueling and retaining these two Poseidon submarines would have contributed significantly and cost-effectively to national security, he would have directed that they be overhauled and retained rather than dismantled. In view of present circumstances, however, including current military and economic realities, the President has directed these submarines be retired and dismantled as planned. As a result, the US will be technically within the terms of SALT II until we equip the 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage later this year.

In addition to this change in US policy, the President has identified several military programmatic responses to Soviet violations. The most essential near-term response to Soviet noncompliance remains the implementation of the President's full strategic modernization program including the second 50

PEACEKEEPER missiles, as well as full funding of the Strategic Defense Initiative in order to provide, if possible, a safer and more stable basis for our future security and that of our Allies.

The strategic modernization program is the foundation for all future US offensive force options. It provides a solid basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. The SDI program represents our best hope for a future in which our security can rest on the increasing contribution of defensive systems that threaten no one.

It is absolutely essential that we maintain full support for these programs. To fail to do so would be the worst response to Soviet noncompliance.

The President's second programmatic response concerns the future of the US ICBM program. The Soviet Union's SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under SALT II, is a clear and irreversible violation. With the number of deployed SS-25 mobile ICBM's at slightly above 70, the President has called upon Congress to rebuild bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of the US ICBM program. This program should include the full deployment of the 100 PEACEKEEPER ICBMs. But it

must also look beyond the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional US ICBM requirements in the future, including the Small ICBM to complement PEACEKEEPER. Therefore, the President has directed the Department of Defense to provide him by November 1986 an assessment of the best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program. This assessment will address the basing of the second 50 PEACEKEEPER missiles and specific alternative configurations for the Small ICBM.

Third, the President has directed that the Advanced Cruise Missile program be accelerated. This would not direct any increase in the total program procurement at this time, but rather would establish a more efficient program that both saves money and accelerates the availability of additional options for the future.

These three programmatic responses to continued Soviet noncompliance are essential to protect US security. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization program is, and should always be, designed to guarantee that our nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to ensure deterrence and underwrite our security and that of our Allies--nothing more and nothing less.

Although the President's decision to dismantle two Poseidon submarines this summer will, as I mentioned, keep the US technically in observance of the terms of the SALT II Treaty until the US equips its 131st heavy bomber for cruise missile carriage near the end of this year--I emphasize that this dismantlement decision is fully in accordance with our modernization program. The President has made clear, however, that given the decision that he has been forced to make by lack of Soviet reciprocity, he intends to continue deployment of US heavy bombers with cruise missiles beyond the 131st aircraft without dismantling additional US systems as compensation under the terms of the SALT II Treaty. Of course, we continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use this time to take the constructive steps necessary to alter the current situation. Should they do so, we will certainly take this into account.

Finally, I would emphasize that no policy of interim restraint is a substitute for an agreement on deep and equitable reductions in offensive nuclear arms, provided that we can be confident of verifying Soviet compliance with it. Achieving such reductions has been, and continues to be, the President's highest priority. Until this is achieved, the United States will continue to exercise the utmost restraint. Assuming no significant change in the threat we face, as we implement the strategic modernization program, the US will not deploy more

strategic nuclear delivery vehicles or strategic ballistic missile warheads than the Soviet Union.

It is time that the Soviets honor their obligations, match US restraint, and get down to negotiating seriously in Geneva. The US hopes the Soviet Union will act to give substance to the agreement reached between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Geneva Summit to achieve early progess, in particular in areas where there is common ground, including the principle of 50 percent reductions in the strategic nuclear arms of both countries, appropriately applied, as well as an interim INF agreement. If the Soviet Union carries out this pledge, we can move now to achieve greater stability and a safer world.

APPENDIX 5

Letter to Chairman Fascell From Jeremy J. Stone, Director, Federation of American Scientists

June 12, 1986

Congressman Dante B. Fascell
Chairman
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Chairman:

Among the many reasons why it would be foolish for the United States to breach the ceilings and subceilings (including the warhead fractionation limits) of the SALT II agreement is a reason that is often overlooked--the potential of SALT II for providing the basis for a subsequent agreement for reductions in strategic forces.

It was not always this way. On November 1, 1979, during the ratification hearings on SALT II, the entire Foreign Relations Committee of the U.S. Senate agreed, by unanimous vote, that the goal, in what was then called SALT III, should be the steady reduction in the limits and sublimits of SALT II (including the limit on heavy missiles). The Committee resolution urged and requested the President:

"...at the earliest possible moment during the SALT III negotiations, on the basis of mutuality, to pursue continuous year-by-year reductions in the ceilings and subceilings under the Treaty so as to take advantage of the Treaty already negotiated and to begin a sustainable and effective process of reductions in strategic arms which promotes strategic equivalence and strategic stability."

At that time, the SALT II negotiator, Paul C. Warnke, called it a "priority item" in SALT III to "try and shrink the SALT II limits, not only the overall aggregate ceiling of strategic nuclear weapons but also the various subceilings on the subcategories."

Among the many advantages of this approach is the potential simplicity of an agreement for percentage

reductions in which, with the agreement on a single number, the percentage, the process of reductions could be started with these ceilings shrunk proportionately year after year.

The Federation can supply the Committee with information showing how closely such proportional shrinkage would be to fulfilling the desires of the various Reagan Administration proposals for strategic reductions--while being quite simple in its concept and negotiability. Indeed, the Committee might well wish to explore the potential of SALT II for effective reductions in a relevant part of its ongoing hearings.

In sum, we believe that, if reductions in strategic weapons are ever secured, it will be from some simple process of reducing these already negotiated and defined limits and sublimits. Accordingly, breaching these limits will foreclose the possibility of any early agreement on real reductions.

Sincerely,

Jeremy J. Stone
Director

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